Global Business & Development Law Journal
Volume 27
Issue 2 Symposium and an Examination of Morrison’s
Impact on the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality

Article 6

2-1-2014

Securities Collective Action and Private
International Law Issues in Dutch WCAM
Settlements: Global Aspirations and Regional
Boundaries
Xandra E. Kramer
Erasmus University, Rotterdam

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Xandra E. Kramer, Securities Collective Action and Private International Law Issues in Dutch WCAM Settlements: Global Aspirations and
Regional Boundaries, 27 Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L.J. 235 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe/vol27/iss2/6

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Global Business & Development Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.

04_KRAMER_MASTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/19/2015 12:51 PM

Securities Collective Action and Private International Law
Issues in Dutch WCAM Settlements: Global Aspirations
and Regional Boundaries
Xandra E. Kramer*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 236

II. DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS IN A GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN
CONTEXT ...................................................................................................... 239
A. Dutch WCAM Settlements: National Icon with Global Aspirations...... 239
B. EU Policy on Collective Redress and Dutch WCAM Settlements ......... 241
1. Sectorial Approaches and the Horizontal Recommendation on
Collective Redress........................................................................... 242
2. Possible Implications for the Dutch WCAM and Cross-Border
Litigation......................................................................................... 245
III. DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION.. 248
A. The Applicable Rules and the Jurisdictional Problem .......................... 249
B. The Brussels Scheme: Relevant Jurisdiction Rules for Securities
Litigation ............................................................................................... 250
C. Vesting Jurisdiction in the Shell and Converium Cases ....................... 253
1. The Shell Settlement........................................................................ 254
2. The Converium Settlement .............................................................. 256
D. Problematic Issues and Further Criticism ............................................ 259
IV. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF DUTCH COLLECTIVE
SETTLEMENTS .............................................................................................. 262
A. Relevance of Recognition and Enforcement and Applicable Rules ....... 262
B. The Brussels I Scheme on Recognition and Enforcement ..................... 264
1. Recognition and Enforcement of Court Judgments ........................ 264
2. Enforcement of Settlements ............................................................. 265
3. Public Policy and Other Grounds of Refusal ................................. 267
C. Recognition and Enforcement in Other Countries ................................ 270

* Professor of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Visiting Professor (TPR Chair) and Global Law
School Professor Leuven University 2013-2014. This contribution has been made possible with the support of
the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (“NWO”) within its Innovational Research Incentives
Scheme (“VIDI”).

235

04_KRAMER_MASTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/19/2015 12:51 PM

2014 / Global Aspirations and Regional Boundaries
V. QUESTIONS OF THE APPLICABLE LAW IN THE DUTCH WCAM
MECHANISM ................................................................................................. 271
A. The Issue of the Applicable Law and Applicable Rules ........................ 271
B. Relevant Choice of Law Rules for Mass Securities Claims ................... 272
C. Dutch Practice and Specific Issues in the WCAM................................. 275
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS .............................................................................. 277
I. INTRODUCTION
Europe has witnessed an intensive debate on collective redress over the
course of the last decade. Unlike in the United States and other common law
oriented countries, class actions and settlements do not yet have a firm grounding
in most European jurisdictions. However, the tide is changing with more than
half of all EU Member States now having established some sort of compensatory
1
collective redress procedure. The European Union has undertaken several
initiatives to regulate collective redress. Current E.U. legislation falls short when
enforcing substantive E.U. law, particularly consumer law and competition law.
At the same time, the great variation between the domestic systems of the
Member States may disturb the desired level playing-field and thus hamper
cross-border litigation. Discussions in the European Union are characterized by
2
opposing views in the Member States and fear for abusive litigation. In June
2013, the European Commission released its long-awaited policy in the form of a
non-binding Recommendation, setting out common principles for collective
3
redress. Establishing a genuine pan-European procedure on collective redress
appeared unfeasible. Nevertheless, this Recommendation marks an important
step for the future of E.U. collective redress.
In the ongoing European debate, the Dutch procedure on the basis of the
Dutch Collective Settlements Act (Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massachade,
4
abbreviated as “WCAM”) plays an important role. The WCAM entered into

1. See, e.g., Stefaan Voet, European Collective Redress Developments, SSRN (Aug. 31, 2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2318809 (describing collective redress developments on the
European level and within the jurisdictions of the Netherlands, Germany, France, and Belgium).
2. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a European Horizontal
Framework for Collective Redress, at 3, COM (2013) 401/2 final (Nov. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Communication
from the Commission].
3. Id. at 4; Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and
Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted
Under Union Law, at 5, COM (2013) 3539/3 final (June 11, 2013).
4. The Dutch government has provided an English summary of the Act and its features. See generally The
Dutch ‘Class Action (Financial Settlement) Act’ (‘WCAM’), RIJKSOVERHEID (June 24, 2008), http://www.
rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/circulaires/2008/06/24/the-dutch-class-action-financial-settlementact-wcam.html.
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5

force in 2005, and since that time has attracted several influential transnational
6
7
8
cases. These include the Shell and Converium securities cases, in which Dutch
settlements were reached, partially complementary to actions and settlements in
the United States. Recently, The Economist mentioned the Netherlands as a
9
favourable venue for class settlements in an article on class actions in Europe.
Furthermore, a quality Dutch Financial Newspaper addressed the issue of the
Netherlands ‘hoping to take over U.S. business’ when the Converium interim
10
decision was rendered in 2010. The rise of the Dutch settlement is in part a
result of the landmark case of Morrison v. Nat’l Australian Bank in which the
U.S. Supreme Court limited securities class actions to U.S. litigants or shares
11
bought on the U.S. stock exchange.
The transnational expansion of the Dutch WCAM procedure is, however, not
without its problems. Its distinct features, notably the ‘settlement without action’
and the opt-out mechanism coupled with the wide jurisdictional reach, have
12
raised criticism in Europe and beyond. It is also questionable if the exclusive
settlement system and opt-out feature are in compliance with the European
Commission’s Recommendation. This makes the wide jurisdiction as adopted by
the Amsterdam Court of Appeal all the more problematic. Additionally, existing
rules on international jurisdiction, particularly those of the Brussels I
13
Regulation, are not well-suited to accommodate the specific design of the Dutch
WCAM. This also raises a second issue, namely whether the court decision to
declare the settlement binding will be recognized and declared enforceable both
inside and outside the European Union. Naturally, businesses willing to settle

5. Id. at 1.
6. See Xandra E. Kramer, Enforcing Mass Settlements in the European Judicial Area: EU Policy and the
Strange Case of Dutch Collective Settlements (WCAM), in RESOLVING MASS DISPUTES: ADR AND
SETTLEMENT OF MASS CLAIMS 63, 78 (Christopher Hodges & Astrid Stadler eds., 2013) (addressing a table
listing these cases).
7. Hof’s-Amsterdam 29 mei 2009, JOR 2009, 197 m.nt. AFJA Leijten [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BI5744]
(Shell Petroleum NV/Dexia Bank NV Netherlands) (Neth.) [hereinafter Shell Petroleum NV].
8. Hof’s-Amsterdam 17 januari 2012, JOR 2012, 51 m.nt. BJ de Jong [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BO3908]
(Scor Holding) (Neth.) [hereinafter Converium].
9. Chasseurs d’ambulances: Class-Action Suits are Coming to Europe, ECONOMIST (Paris) (May 11, 2013)
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21577426-class-action-suits-are-coming-europe-chasseurs-dambulances.
10. Anne de Groot, Nederland Hoopt Stokje VS Over te Nemen als Land van Class Actions, HET
FINANCIEELE DAGBLAD (Nov. 17, 2010) (The Netherlands hopes to take over from the US as the country of
class actions).
11. Morrison v. Nat’l Australian Bank Ltd.,130 S. Ct 2869, 2883 (2010); see Linda J. Silberman,
Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Implications for Global Securities Class Actions, in
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 363 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein eds., 2012); see Ahold
Decisions, INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO CLASS & GROUP ACTIONS 2011; see Wulf A. Kaal
& Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law After Morrison v.
National Australia Bank, 97 MINN. L. REV. 132, 165-85 (2012).
12. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 11, 14.
13. As of January 10, 2015, a new Regulation as a result of the recast of the current Regulation will be
applicable. European Parliament and Council Regulation 1215/2012, art. 66, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 (EU).
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aim for the preclusive effect of such settlements. Similar doubts have been
expressed in relation to the recognition and enforcement of the United States opt14
out class action and class settlement. A third question relates to the applicable
law in those transnational cases, although this issue has triggered less debate, and
is not regarded as problematic in Dutch practice. Traditional choice of law rules
in the European Union, notably the Rome I Regulation (with reference to
contractual disputes) and the Rome II Regulation (with respect to non-contractual
15
actions), are not well adapted to claims related to mass harm.
This article explores the issues of international jurisdiction, recognition and
enforcement and the applicable law in relation to transnational WCAM
settlements, particularly in securities cases. It questions whether these matters are
adequately addressed in Dutch practice, against the background of the existing
(E.U.) legislation, and whether the current legislative framework is able to
facilitate class actions and settlements. Part II discusses the WCAM against the
16
background of its use in transnational cases and E.U. policy initiatives. The
article will not address the general features and practice of this procedure in
detail, since these are discussed in other contributions in this journal and
17
elsewhere. Part III will focus on the international jurisdiction of the Dutch
18
courts to declare a collective settlement under the WCAM binding. Part IV will
elaborate on the recognition and enforcement of collective settlements in the E.U.
19
Member States and in other countries. In Part V several questions regarding the
20
applicable law to collective settlements will be discussed. Part VI will draw
some conclusions on the use of the Dutch WCAM in transnational securities

14. See generally Andrea Pinna, Recognition and Res Judicata of US Class Action Judgments in
European Legal Systems, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 31 (2008); see generally Mark Stiggelbout, The Recognition in
England and Wales of United States Judgments in Class Actions, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 433 (2011); see generally
Rachael Mulheron, The Recognition, and Res Judicata Effect, of a United States Class Actions Judgment in
England: A Rebuttal of Vivendi, 75 MODERN L. REV. 180 (2012); see generally Stefania Bariatti, Recognition
and Enforcement in the EU of Judicial Decisions Rendered Upon Class Actions: The Case of U.S. and Dutch
Judgments and Settlements, in RECASTING BRUSSELS I 319 (Fausto Pocar et al. eds., 2012); see generally
Antonio Gidi, The Recognition of U.S. Class Action Judgments Abroad: The Case of Latin America, 37 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 893 (2012).
15. European Parliament and Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, 6 (EC) [hereinafter
Rome I]; European Parliament and Council Regulation 864/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 42 (EC) [hereinafter
Rome II].
16. See infra Part II.
17. See generally Willem H. Van Boom, Collective Settlement of Mass Claims in the Netherlands, in AUF
DEM WEG ZU EINER EUROPÄISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE 171 (Matthias Casper et al. eds., 2009); see generally
Tomas Arons & Willem H. Van Boom, Beyond Tulips and Cheese: Exporting Mass Securities Claim
Settlements from The Netherlands, 22 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 857 (2010); see generally Ianika Tzankova & Hélène
van Lith, Class Actions and Class Settlements Going Global: An Update from the Netherlands, in
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 67 (2012). See also The Dutch ‘Class Action (Financial
Settlement) Act’ (‘WCAM’), supra note 4.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
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cases while considering the background of the European Commission’s
21
Recommendation.
II. DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS IN A GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT
A. Dutch WCAM Settlements: National Icon with Global Aspirations
Intended to operate as an addition to the possibility for foundations and
associations to file for injunctive relief on behalf of interested persons in order to
22
23
protect their rights, the Dutch legislature passed the WCAM in 2005. This Act
24
was originally not intended to handle transnational securities cases. Its
introduction was triggered by a pharmaceutical product liability case, the DES
25
affair, which only involved Dutch litigants. In this case, the Dutch Supreme
26
Court had already established liability. The industry involved was keen to reach
a damages settlement, but a proper legal mechanism for collective settlement was
27
28
absent. The WCAM was established to fill this gap. The Act consists of four
29
provisions in the Dutch Civil Code dealing with the settlement as such, and six
provisions in the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure concerning the court procedure
at the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (which is exclusively competent in these
30
matters).
The Dutch mass settlement regime is rather unique in Europe. Outside
Europe—and especially in the United States, Australia and Canada—mass
settlements also play an important role, since many class actions are ultimately
settled. However, as opposed to these systems, the Netherlands does not have a
collective action for the compensation of damages; it relies solely on settlements.
Representative association(s) or foundation(s) conclude, on behalf of the victims
(designated as “interested parties” or “beneficiaries”), a settlement agreement
31
with the allegedly responsible party. Upon joint request, the Amsterdam Court

21. See infra Part VI.
22. See BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] art. 3:305a (Neth.). This provision does not enable claims for
compensatory relief.
23. The Dutch ‘Class Action (Financial Settlement) Act’ (‘WCAM’), supra note 4.
24. See generally Hof’s-Amsterdam 1 juni 2006, NJ 2006, 461 m.nt. [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2006:
AAX6440] (Bayer AG/Ace European Group Ltd.) (Neth.) [hereinafter Bayer AG].
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2.3.
27. Id. at 3.1.
28. The Dutch ‘Class Action (Financial Settlement) Act’ (‘WCAM’), supra note 4.
29. BW art. 7:907-10 (Neth.).
30. See WETBOEK VAN BURGERLIJKE RECHTSVORDERING [RV] art. 1013-18a (Neth.).
31. BW art. 7:907 (Neth.). It provides that “[a]n agreement for the purpose of compensating damage
caused by an event or similar events, concluded between a foundation or association with full legal capacity and
one or more other parties who have engaged themselves under this agreement to pay compensation for this
damage may, upon the joint request of the parties, . . . be declared binding by the court for other persons to
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32

of Appeal declares the settlement binding. Unlike, for example, in the U.S. class
33
action and settlement system, no ‘class member’ represents a group. If the
interested parties do not wish to be bound, they should make use of the opt-out
34
possibility. To safeguard fairness of the settlement, the law imposes rules on the
representativeness of the foundation or association as well as a reasonableness
35
test as to the amount of damages. In practice, the Amsterdam Court plays a very
active role in the whole process, including the service (notification) of (foreign)
36
interested parties.
As mentioned, the Dutch system is based solely on a settlement, as collective
action for compensation is not yet available. In creating the WCAM mechanism,
the Dutch legislature clarified that it was inspired by the U.S. class action and
37
particularly the practical experience. It deliberately chose to omit the action
part, for which it provided the following reasoning:
The WCAM opts for a collective settlement in order to avoid the
complications that arise fairly often in American damages class actions.
These happen because many of the issues connected with a compensation
claim can only be answered individually. They might include, for
example, issues of causality, contributory negligence and especially the
extent of the damage. Once the legal issues in common have been dealt
with, all of the individual victims then have to get involved in the
proceedings so as to obtain answers to the issues affecting them
individually. The result is that completion of a class action is quite often
38
extremely complex and time-consuming.
39

To date, six settlements have been declared binding under the WCAM. A
seventh request for a binding declaration has been filed in the insolvency case
40
involving the DSB bank to compensate its former customers in May 2013.

whom the damage was caused, provided that the foundation or association represents the interests of these
persons pursuant to its articles of association (articles of incorporation).” Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. BW art. 7:908(2) (Neth.).
35. BW art. 7:907(3)(e)-(f) (Neth.).
36. See, e.g., Hof’s-Amsterdam 23 april 2013 [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:BZ8345] (Appellant/Varde
Investments Ltd.) (Neth.) at 4 [hereinafter Varde Investments Ltd.].
37. The Dutch ‘Class Action (Financial Settlement) Act’ (‘WCAM’), supra note 4.
38. Id.
39. Bayer AG, supra note 24; Varde Investments Ltd., supra note 36; Hof’s-Amsterdam 29 april 2009,
NJF 2009, 247 m.nt. [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BI2717] (Stichting Vie D’Or) (Neth.) [hereinafter Vie D’Or];
Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7; Hof’s-Amsterdam 15 juli 2009, JOR 2009, 325 m.nt. A.C.W.
[ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BJ2691] (Randstad Holding N.V.) (Neth.) [hereinafter Vedior]; Converium, supra
note 8; Kramer, supra note 6, at 78 (addressing a table listing these cases).
40. See Administrators of DSB Bank N.V., Insolvency Report No. 18 (2013), available at http://www.
dsbbank.nl/crediteuren/en/public-reports/dsb-bank-%28public-reports%29/ (addressing the Eighteenth Public
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Dutch practitioners generally regard it as a satisfactory system. In 2013, several
amendments to the Act have been introduced to regulate collective redress in
insolvency cases and to strengthen certain requirements, inter alia those
regarding the representativeness, procedural fairness, and the service of foreign
41
defendants.
Although the WCAM was not established with a view to transnational
42
commercial cases, it has attracted international attention. While the first three
settlement cases involved few cross-border elements, the Shell, Vedior, and
43
Converium settlements involved many foreign interested parties. The
Converium case not only involved primarily non-Dutch residents as interested
parties, but also a responsible party with a corporate seat in Switzerland and
concerned misleading information regarding stocks sold on the Swiss stock
44
exchange. The apparent globalization of the WCAM settlements has
undoubtedly been boosted by the Morrison ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court,
closing the door on non-US residents buying stocks on a foreign stock exchange
45
(‘foreign cubed actions’). The Shell and Converium settlements were in part
46
complementary to US settlements, and were confined to non-U.S. residents.
B. E.U. Policy on Collective Redress and Dutch WCAM Settlements
47

The E.U. has been particularly active in the area of collective redress. This
has been triggered by problems encountered in the enforcement of consumer law
and competition law, and in the increasing importance of collective redress under
the national laws of the Member States and in practice. The E.U. debate is
marked by strong lobbies pro and contra collective redress and opposite views on
the appropriate model, against the background of a great variety of domestic
48
systems in the Member States and the fear for abusive litigation.

Report on the DSB Bank in English).
41. See Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Amendments to the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure
and the Bankruptcy Act to Facilitate the Collective Settlement of Mass Claims Further (Law Amending the Law
Collective Settlement), OVERHEID.NL (June 13, 2013), https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-33126C.html.
42. Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7, at 3.2; Vedior, supra note 39; Converium, supra note 8, at 1-2.
43. See generally Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7, at 3.2; Vedior, supra note 39, at 2.8; Converium,
supra note 8, at 1-2.
44. Converium, supra note 8, at 2.
45. See Kaal & Painter, supra note 11, at 165.
46. Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7, at 3.2; Converium, supra note 8, at 1-2.
47. See Duncan Fairgrieve & Geraint Howells, Collective Redress Procedures: European Debates, in
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 15-41 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein, eds., 1st ed. 2012)
for an overview of the initiatives and developments.
48. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 3.
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1. Sectorial Approaches and the Horizontal Recommendation on Collective
Redress
Initially, the European debate focused on sectorial approaches in the area of
49
competition law and consumer law. The Directorate General Competition (“DG
50
COMP”) commissioned a study on the issue of damages and redress. This 2004
study concluded that the award of private damages for the violation of E.U.
51
competition law were underdeveloped. In 2005, a Green Paper on Damages
52
Actions for Breach of E.U. Anti-Trust Rules was published, followed by a
White Paper in 2008, containing specific proposals to overcome the hurdles in
53
private enforcement of competition law. It promoted a combination of collective
redress brought by representative organizations, such as consumer or trade
associations, and collective actions brought by individuals based upon an opt-in
54
model.
At the same time, the Directorate General on Health and Consumers (“DG
SANCO”) was working on collective redress for the protection of consumers.
The current legislative framework already provides for limited collective action
in the area of consumer law pursuant of Directive 98/27/EC on Consumer
55
Injunctions. However, the Directive only deals with representative injunctive
relief and does not provide for skimming off profits as a result of a violation of
56
consumer rules or compensatory relief for consumers. Several studies have
shown that consumers have relatively little opportunity to make use of the
57
existing mechanisms, and that financing is one of the main concerns. In 2008, a
Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress was published presenting various
options ranging from no additional action to enacting a European collective
58
redress procedure. After a follow-up consultation paper published in 2009, as

49. The competence for E.U. initiatives in these areas are laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union arts. 101, 102, 169, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 49 [hereinafter TEFU]. The general
competence for measures to harmonize the law is laid down in TFEU article 114.
50. See generally DENIS WAELBROECK, ET AL., STUDY ON THE CONDITIONS OF CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES IN
CASE OF INFRINGEMENT OF EC COMPETITION RULES: COMPARATIVE REPORT 3 (Aug. 31, 2014), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf.
51. Id. (provinding an overview of activities). The debate was triggered by a CJEU ruling stating that
victims of a breach of E.U. competition rules have a right to damages. Case C-453/89, Courage v. Crehan, 2001
E.C.R. I-6297 at 78.
52. See generally Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules,
COM (2005) 672 final (Dec. 19, 2005).
53. See generally Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules,
COM (2008) 165 final (April 2, 2008).
54. Id. at 4.
55. Council Directive 98/27, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51, 52 (EC).
56. Id.
57. Health and Consumers, EUROPEAN UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/index_en.htm (last
updated Apr. 12, 2013).
58. Commission Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, at 7-14, COM (2008) 794 final (Nov. 27, 2008).
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well as various hearings and informal meetings, concrete initiatives were
59
suspended.
In 2010, the Directorate Generals COMP and SANCO joined forces and
were accompanied by DG Justice, since it was acknowledged that collective
redress not only is about enforcing substantive law, but also has important
60
implications for civil justice. In 2011, a public consultation paper was published
on a ‘Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress,’ providing important
61
input to the European debate. This is also evidenced by the fact that this
Consultation paper received over 19,000 responses from Governments,
62
associations, and other stakeholders, as well as from individuals. Three of the
questions put forward in this paper concerned the cross-border application of
63
collective redress. In particular, the possible need for rules on international
64
jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement was addressed. These two
issues have raised concern in the cross-border application of the Dutch WCAM
65
procedure.
In a Resolution adopted on its own initiative in January 2012, the European
Parliament showed for the first time a certain willingness to establish European
66
rules on collective redress. The Resolution stated that this action should take the
67
form of a horizontal instrument, covering all areas of E.U. law. The Parliament
pointed out that Europe must refrain from introducing a U.S.-style class action or
68
any system that does not respect European legal traditions. It even referred to
the U.S. class action system, including third-party funding and punitive damages
69
as supporting ‘frivolous litigation.’ The Resolution underlines the need for
70
stringent safeguards to avoid abuse. These concern inter alia standing, the opt59. Consultation Paper for Discussion on the Follow-Up to the Green Paper on Consumer Collective
Redress (May 29, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/docs/consultation_paper
2009.pdf.
60. The cooperation between these DGs had also been instructed by President Barrosso in 2010. See A
Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress: Next Steps, Joint Information Note by Vice-President
Viviane Reding, Vice-President Joaquín Almunia and Commissioner John Dalli , in Towards a Coherent
European Approach to Collective Redress, at 3, SEC (2010) 1192 (Oct. 5, 2010).
61. See generally Commission Staff Working Document on Public Consultation, in Towards a Coherent
European Approach to Collective Redress, SEC (2010) 1192 (Oct. 5, 2010).
62. For a summary of the outcomes, see Burkhard Hess, et al., Evaluation of Contributions to the Public
Consultation and Hearing: “Towards a Coherent Approach to Collective Redress” (Study JUST/2010//
JCIV/CT/OO27/A4) at 4, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/
study_heidelberg_summary_en.pdf.
63. Specifically, questions 14, 29, and 31. Id. at 9, 13.
64. Id. at 6-7, 13.
65. See infra Parts III, IV.
66. European Parliament Resolution 2011/2089 (INI) at no. 4; see also the Motion for a European
Parliament Resolution, (2011/2089(INI)).
67. European Parliament Resolution 2011/2089 (INI) at no. 1.
68. Id. at no. 2.
69. Id.
70. Id. at no. 20.
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in model as the only acceptable model, the loser-pays principle, and a ban on
71
third-party funding. It further considered that an ADR system should be backed
up by an effective judicial redress system, in order to give incentive to parties to
72
settle.
In June 2013, the European Commission released its Communication
Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory
73
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States. This is accompanied by a
Communication entitled ‘Towards a European Horizontal Framework for
74
Collective Redress,’ outlining background and policy pickets. Additionally, the
Commission adopted a proposal for actions for damages under national law for
75
infringements of E.U. competition law. However, this proposed directive does
not oblige Member States to put collective redress mechanisms in place to
76
enforce competition law. The Recommendation aims “to facilitate access to
justice, stop illegal practices and enable injured parties to obtain
compensation . . . while ensuring appropriate procedural safeguards to avoid
77
abusive litigation.” For this purpose, it recommends that all Member States have
collective redress mechanisms in place “for both injunctive and compensatory
78
relief, which respect the basic principles set out in this Recommendation.”
These principles respect the different legal traditions of the Member States,
however, they should ensure that the procedures are fair, equitable, timely and
not prohibitively expensive. The explicit mention of the different legal traditions
points to the difficult discussions that took place in view of the diverging national
79
systems and the objections of some Member States against E.U. intervention.

71. Id.
72. Id. at no. 25.
73. Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union
Law, supra note 3, at 5.
74. See generally id.
75. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain Rules Governing
Actions for Damages Under National Law for Infringements of the Competition Law Provisions of the Member
States and of the European Union, at 2, COM (2013) 404 final (June 11, 2013).
76. Id. at 23.
77. Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union
Law, supra note 3, at 5.
78. Id.
79. The Recommendation defines “collective redress” as: “(i) a legal mechanism that ensures a possibility
to claim cessation of illegal behaviour collectively by two or more natural or legal persons or by an entity
entitled to bring a representative action (injunctive collective redress); (ii) a legal mechanism that ensures a
possibility to claim compensation collectively by two or more natural or legal persons claiming to have been
harmed in a mass harm situation or by an entity entitled to bring a representative action (compensatory
collective redress).” A “mass harm situation” is very extensively defined as “a situation where two or more
natural or legal persons claim to have suffered harm causing damage resulting from the same illegal activity of
one or more natural or legal persons.” Id.
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The common principles relate to the standing to bring a representative action,
admissibility of actions, information on a collective redress action, and the loser
80
pays principle, as well as funding. The Dutch collective settlement system by
81
and large complies with these specific requirements. As a result of the recent
amendment of the WCAM, the rules on the representation have become stricter
82
to secure representativeness. The reimbursement of legal costs and (third party)
funding is not an issue, since the responsible party (i.e., business) wishing to
83
settle bears all the costs. More important for the present purposes, the
Recommendation states that “[t]he claimant party should be formed on the basis
of express consent of the natural or legal persons claiming to have been harmed
84
(‘opt-in’ principle).” ADR and settlements are presented as an addition to
85
judicial procedures. The possible implications of these principles, as well as
cross-border aspects will be elaborated in the following sub-section.
2. Possible Implications for the Dutch WCAM and Cross-Border Litigation
86

The Recommendation is a set of non-binding common principles. It is
unusual for the Commission to choose this particular type of instrument, but for
the moment it is the only compromise that was feasible on this matter. A
proposal for a binding regulation or directive would have needed the approval of
the Council and the European Parliament, and it would have been unlikely that
the required majority of Member States would approve a harmonised system of
87
European collective redress. However, the Recommendation is not merely a
shot in the dark. “The Member States should implement the principles set out in
this Recommendation in national collective redress systems by [26 July 2015] at
88
the latest.” It further obliges Member States to collect reliable annual statistics

80. Id. at 4-17.
81. But see supra Part II.B.ii.
82. See supra Part II.A.
83. See supra Part II.A.
84. Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union
Law, supra note 3, at 21.
85. Id. at 25-28.
86. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain Rules Governing
Actions for Damages Under National Law for Infringements of the Competition Law Provisions of the Member
States and of the European Union, supra note 75.
87. Such uniform procedures have in recent years been established for orders for payment, European
Order for Payment Procedure, 2006 O.J. (L 399) at 1, and small claims, European Small Claims Procedure,
2007 O.J. (L 199) at 1; while a proposal for a European account preservation order is pending. Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Creating a European Account Preservation Order to
Facilitate Cross-Border Debt Recovery in Civil & Commercial Matters, at 1, COM (2011) 445 final (July 25,
2011).
88. Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union
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on judicial and out-of-court collective redress. Furthermore, it is to be expected
that the Commission will have a stringent follow-up and that this
90
Recommendation is only a first step in the further harmonization. Additionally,
the Recommendation may have a more indirect effect, particularly on the
91
recognition of Dutch settlements in other Member States.
The Dutch WCAM scheme is, however, not in compliance with the common
principles of the Recommendation in all respects. The first important issue is that
92
the Recommendation requires a collective action system. Settlements are only
encouraged to settle the dispute and to be verified by a court taking into
93
consideration the interests and rights of all parties involved. As discussed
earlier, the Netherlands deliberately chose not to put a collection action for the
94
compensation of damage in place when the WCAM was enacted. However, in
2011 a motion was filed to extend the current scheme for collective injunctive
relief filed by representative organisations, pursuant to Article 3:305a BW to
95
compensation for victims. To date, this initiative has not yet resulted in more
concrete steps. In its response to the Recommendation of the Commission, the
Dutch Government does not respond to this issue. Generally, the Dutch
government expresses its doubts on whether the Recommendation fulfils the E.U.
96
law requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity. The Netherlands does not
seem to have the immediate intention to establish a collective action to accord
with the Recommendation.
The second possible incompatibility is that the Recommendation is clearly
based on an opt-in principle, though it does not fully shut the door on opt-out
97
mechanisms. The abovementioned Recommendation No. 21 adds that any
exception to the opt-in principles, by law or by court order, “should be duly
98
justified by reasons of sound administration of justice.” In its response to the
Recommendation, the Dutch Ministry stated that the Netherlands assumes that
Law, supra note 3, at 10.
89. Id.
90. This is a policy tactic that has also been pursued in the area of ADR, where in the 1990’s
Recommendations were released and that has eventually resulted in several binding instruments.
91. See infra Part IV.
92. Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union
Law, supra note 3, at 7.
93. Id. at 8.
94. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
95. The so-called ‘motie Dijksma’, see Tweede Kamer der Generaal, Vergaderjaar, 33000-XIII, no. 14 at
2 (2011-12), available at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-33000-XIII-14.html.
96. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar, 22 113, no. 1663, Fiche ‘Mededeling en
Aanbeveling Europees Horizontaal Kader Voor Collectief Verhaal’, no. 4, at 3 (2012-13) (stating that European
initiatives have added value as far as they concern cross-border cases and that as far as the type of procedures
and the structure of procedures are concerned Member States should be able to employ their own initiatives).
97. See generally Communication from the Commission, supra note 2.
98. Id. at 11.
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the exclusivity of the opt-in principle does not apply to collective settlements. It
continues that in case the European Commission also intends to extend its
100
application to settlements, the Netherlands has serious questions. It argues that
the associated risk of abuse does not extend to the Dutch settlement system; optout is effective for settlements and the WCAM system works satisfactorily for
101
the settling parties. Though these may be good arguments, it will likely not
eliminate the European criticism of the Dutch WCAM.
In regards to the cross-border aspects, the Recommendation provides little
102
guidance. Recommendation No. 17 provides that Member States should ensure
that where a dispute concerns parties from different Member States, a single
collective action in a single forum is not prevented by national rules on
admissibility or standing of foreign groups of claimants or representative
103
entities. The Dutch WCAM mechanism clearly involves foreign victims and
104
the law does not prohibit foreign representatives.
According to
Recommendation No. 18, any representative entity that has been officially
designated in advance by a Member State to have standing should be permitted to
105
seize the court in the Member State having jurisdiction. This provision should
ensure the recognition and legal standing of representative entities in other
106
Member States.
The Recommendation does not touch at all upon the questions of
international jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement or the applicable
107
law. In the accompanying Communication, the Commission remarks that many
108
stakeholders have in fact asked for jurisdictional rules. However, views differ
109
as to the content of such rules. The Commission considers that the rules of the

99. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar, ‘Mededeling en Aanbeveling Europees
Horizontaal Kader Voor Collectief Verhaal’, supra note 96, at 4.
100. See generally Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and
Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted
Under Union Law, supra note 3.
101. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 11.
102. See generally Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar, ‘Mededeling en Aanbeveling
Europees Horizontaal Kader Voor Collectief Verhaal’, supra note 96.
103. Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union
Law, supra note 3, at 7.
104. See generally HÉLÈNE VAN LITH, THE DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS ACT AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_
redress/saw_annex_en.pdf.
105. Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union
Law, supra note 3, at 7.
106. See id.
107. See generally id.
108. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 13.
109. See supra Part II.B.ii.
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Brussels I Regulation should be “fully exploited.” In view of the jurisdictional
problems, as will be elaborated in the next section, this lack of further guidance is
111
to be regretted. As to issues of recognition and enforcement, the Commission
remarks that a future report on the application of the Brussels I Regulation should
include information on the effective enforcement of cross-border collective
112
redress actions. However, the subsequent report on the recently amended
113
Brussels I Regulation is only to be expected by 2022. In relation to applicable
law, the Commission states that it is not persuaded that special conflict of law
114
rules are required to avoid the application of multiple laws. This means that the
existing European private international law rules will continue to govern crossborder collective settlements under the Dutch WCAM. In that regard the
Recommendation is a missed opportunity
III. DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION
This section focuses on the question whether the Amsterdam Court of Appeal
has international jurisdiction to assess the settlement and to declare it binding for
it to have preclusive effect. International jurisdiction in Dutch and E.U. law
115
should be distinguished from subject-matter jurisdiction under U.S. law, as was
at stake in the landmark case of Morrison v. National Australian Bank, where it
was ruled that the Securities Exchange Act did not extend to investors residing
outside the United States that purchased from a non-U.S. defendant on a foreign
116
securities exchange. From a European perspective this would be viewed as the
scope of the domestic law, or an issue of choice of law. However, the result of
not having international jurisdiction and not having subject-matter jurisdiction is
in essence the same: those (foreign) parties are not welcome in court. It must be
noted that the limited application of Dutch laws on financial services, for
example the Act of Financial Supervision (Wet Financieel Toezicht) to financial
institutions in the Netherlands, is not considered in the context of international
jurisdiction or the admissibility of claims relating to private damages or
117
compensation in a civil law suit.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
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Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 13.
See supra Part II.B.ii.
Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, 13-14.
See Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 13, at art. 79.
Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 14.
See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Australian Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
See id.
See WET FINANCIEEL TOEZICHT [WFT] (Act of Financial Supervision), §§ 1:2, 1:6.
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A. The Applicable Rules and the Jurisdictional Problem
In the Netherlands, three jurisdictional systems are relevant for commercial
cases and have been applied in WCAM cases. The primary system is that of the
118
Brussels I Regulation. Resulting from a recast, as of January 10, 2012, this
Regulation will be replaced by an amended version, referred to as the Brussels I119
bis Regulation. This Regulation will not bring about important changes in
120
relation to the jurisdiction rules relevant for securities collective redress. The
Brussels I Regulation applies generally in civil and commercial matters, in the
situation where the defendant is domiciled in an E.U. Member State, or where the
courts of an E.U. Member States have been chosen by way of a forum selection
121
clause. The concept of domicile is in relation to legal persons widely defined in
Article 60 Brussels I, and is either the place of the statutory seat (in the United
Kingdom and Ireland the registered seat), or the central administration, or the
122
principal place of business. For natural persons Article 59 refers to the national
123
law of the Member States. In particular cases, the parallel Lugano Convention
applies, notably where defendants from Iceland, Norway or Switzerland are
124
involved or where the courts of these countries have been chosen. Hereafter,
where reference to the Brussels I Regulation is made, the same will apply to the
Lugano Convention.
Where neither the Brussels I Regulation nor the Lugano Convention applies,
domestic international jurisdiction rules apply. The Dutch Code of Civil
Procedure includes rules in Articles 1-14 that are largely based on the Brussels I
system, though the domestic rules are generally less strict than the distributive
125
E.U. rules. A feature of the Dutch domestic rules relevant in the context of
WCAM settlements is that it includes a specific rule for cases introduced by way
of a petition, as opposed to cases that are brought to court by way of a writ of
126
summons. Petition cases under Dutch law are certain family cases, as well as
specific requests in relation to inter alia corporations. Also the request to declare
a WCAM settlement binding is a petition procedure, which means that Article 3
127
of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure applies. Contrary to the defendant118. Kramer, supra note 6, at 63-90.
119. See Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 13.
120. Kramer, supra note 6, at 63-90.
121. See Council Regulation 44/2001, arts. 1-2, 4, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1.
122. See generally id. at art. 60.
123. See generally id. at art. 59.
124. See generally Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 13.
125. See generally Rv arts. 1-14 (Neth.).
126. Id. at art. 3.
127. Id. (“Where legal proceedings are to be initiated by a petition of the petitioner or his solicitor and it
concerns other legal proceedings then those meant in Article 4 and 5, Dutch courts have jurisdiction:
a. if either the petitioner or, where there are more petitioners, one of them, or one of the interested
parties mentioned in the petition has his domicile or habitual residence in the Netherlands;
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orientated Brussels I and Lugano rules, this Dutch provision provides for the
Dutch court if the petitioner is domiciled or has his habitual residence in the
128
Netherlands.
The application of the jurisdictional rules under these systems and
particularly the European rules poses challenges. These rules are designed in
view of typical litigation where one claimant and one defendant are involved and
129
are not tailored to collective cross-border litigation. The specific Dutch WCAM
scheme makes the application of the existing jurisdictional rules even more
complicated. In a classical collective action, the group of victims is to be
regarded as the plaintiff whereas the responsible business is the defendant.
However, in the situation of the WCAM an out-of-court settlement is reached
between the responsible business and the representative organization(s) and/or
130
association(s) on behalf of the interested parties (injured parties). The question
is on which basis the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has international jurisdiction to
declare the settlement binding in the defendant-oriented European jurisdictional
scheme.
B. The Brussels Scheme: Relevant Jurisdiction Rules for Securities Litigation
The general rule of the Brussels I Regulation is that the court of the Member
131
State where the defendant is domiciled has jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 11.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has repeatedly emphasized
132
the primacy of this rule, making the other rules the exception. This provision
allows for the bundling of claims against a single defendant in a classical class
133
action setting. It does not require any further connection to this forum and thus
also applies where a tort or contractual breach occurred in another country or
134
where (all) plaintiffs reside in another country. The CJEU outlawed the forum
non conveniens exception under the Brussels I Regulation and specifically
135
Article 2, even where the competing forum is a non-E.U. country. In relation to
the Dutch WCAM, the question is which party is to be regarded as the defendant.
b. if the petition relates to proceedings which are or have to be initiated by a writ of summons and
which fall under the jurisdiction of the Dutch courts;
c. if the legal proceedings are otherwise sufficiently connected with the Dutch legal sphere.”)
128. Id.
129. Horatia Muir Watt, Brussels I and Aggregate Litigation or the Case for Redesigning the Common
Judicial Area in Order to Respond to Changing Dynamics, Functions and Structures in Contemporary
Adjudication and Litigation, 30 IPRAX, at 112 (2010).
130. See generally Kaal & Painter, supra note 11, at 133, 165-85.
131. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at art. 11.
132. See generally Case C-189/87, Athanasios Kalfelis v. Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst and
Co., 1988 E.C.R. 5565.
133. See id.
134. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at 4-5.
135. Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2002 E.C.R. I-1383.
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In the following sub-section, it will be discussed that the Dutch Court has held
that the interested parties should be regarded as defendants, and thus Article 2
136
137
applies. It is submitted that this approach is highly questionable.
Moreover, Article 6(1) Brussels I Regulation provides an alternative
138
jurisdiction rule regarding multiple defendants. It only applies where “the
claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them
together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate
139
proceedings.” The CJEU has construed this ground of jurisdiction narrowly
140
since it deprives (other) defendants from litigating in their home forum. This
provision is not to be applied to the situation where multiple plaintiffs are
141
involved. However, since the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has held that the
interested parties are to be regarded as defendants, Article 6(1) may be of use in
142
the WCAM procedure. This provision does not extend to all cases. It does not
apply to cases where protective jurisdiction rules apply, namely consumer
143
contracts, insurance contracts and employment contracts. These protective rules
will, however, generally be of little relevance in securities litigation. If in a case,
the investor is to be qualified as a consumer within the meaning of Article 15
Brussels I, this would result in (exclusive) jurisdiction of the court where the
144
consumer has his habitual residence.
Alternative jurisdictional rules relating to the subject matter of the case are
145
provided in Article 5 Brussels I Regulation. Article 5(1) relates to contractual
obligations and provides jurisdiction for the court where the contract is to be
performed. Article 5(3) is concerned with tortious claims and refers to the court
146
of the place where the harmful event occurred. Generally, it may be expected
that the tort provision will have the most potential for the basis for jurisdiction in
collective redress cases, and would to a certain extent enable parties to
147
concentrate the case in one single forum. This is particularly so since the CJEU
has interpreted this rule in its famous Rhinewater case as giving the claimant a
choice between the place where the harmful event giving rise to the damage

136. See infra Part III.C.i.
137. See infra Part III.C.i.
138. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at 4-5.
139. Id.
140. See Case C-189/87, Athanasios Kalfelis v. Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst and Co., 1988
E.C.R. 5565 (a landmark case).
141. See Eva Lein, Cross-Border Collective Redress and Jurisdiction under Brussels I, in
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 129, 138 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein eds., 2012).
142. Id. at 139.
143. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at 5-7.
144. Id. at 7.
145. Id. at 4.
146. Id.
147. See id.
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148

occurred and the place where the damage was sustained. However, as will be
discussed more extensively in the following sub-section, in Dutch practice, it is
the contract-jurisdiction included in Article 5(1) that has been used to vest
149
jurisdiction.
The last head of jurisdiction to be considered is the choice of forum as laid
down in Article 23 Brussels I Regulation. It provides liberal rules to select the
150
court of a Member State. However, in relation to the Dutch WCAM, it is
doubtful whether the opt-out scheme would suffice to fulfill the requirement of
151
true consent. In legal literature, it has been argued with reference to the Gerling
152
case of the CJEU that interested parties in the WCAM scheme are likely to be
bound as non-party beneficiaries on whose behalf the choice of court agreement
153
has been breached. However, this case concerned the situation where the
beneficiary actively invoked the choice of forum agreement to bring proceedings
in another court as an alternative to the otherwise applicable rules of
154
jurisdiction. Other case law seems to be more restrictive in relation to third
parties, particularly where weaker parties (e.g., consumers, insured
155
parties/beneficiaries) are concerned. Additionally, the general E.U. ban on optout schemes seems not to favor the binding force of a choice of court in relation
to an interested party that did not explicitly opt out. In Dutch practice, the
inclusion of a choice of court clause in the settlement agreement is not (yet)
standard.
As a matter restricting jurisdiction, the rules on parallel proceedings pose
challenges. Articles 27-30 Brussels I provide a rather stringent regime on a ‘first
156
come, first serve basis.’ The issue could arise where litigants, groups of
148. Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735.
149. See infra Part III.C.
150. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at 8.
151. See, e.g., Lein, supra note 141, at 138; M.F. Poot, Internationale Afwikkeling van Massaschade met
de Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade, in GESCHRIFTEN VANWEGE DE VERENIGING CORPORATE
LITIGATION 2005-2006, 179 (M. Holtzer, et al. eds., 2006).
152. Case 201/82, Gerling Konzern Speziale Kreditversicherungs-AG v. Amministrazione del Tesoro
dello Stato, 1983 E.C.R. 2503.
153. See Astrid Stadler, Die Grenzüberschreitende Durchsetzbarkeit von Sammelklagen, in AUF DEM
WEG ZU EINER EUROPÄISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE? 159 (Matthias Casper, et al. eds., 2009) (discussing
enforceability of class action agreements though not specifically in relation to the WCAM); VAN LITH, supra
note 104.
154. See generally Gerling Konzern Speziale Kreditversicherungs-AG, E.C.R. 2503.
155. See, e.g., Case C-112/03, Société financière et industrielle du Peloux v. Axa Belgium, 2005 E.C.R. I3707. This case was, however, distinct from the Gerling case, supra note 152. It concerned the exception to the
prohibition of choice of forum clauses in (consumer) insurance contracts, where the choice of court is in favor
of the court of the common residence of the parties. The Court ruled that a choice of court cannot be invoked
against a third-party beneficiary of the (group) insurance contract, where it would undermine the objective of
protection of the weaker party (which was the case in this situation, since the beneficiary was domiciled in
another Member State).
156. For extensive discussion on this matter, see generally Justine N. Stefanelli, Parallel Litigation and
Cross-Border Collective Actions Under the Brussels I Framework: Lessons From Abroad, in
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litigants, or interested parties are (potentially) involved in collective actions or
settlements pursued in different Member States, or where an individual litigant
starts proceedings in another Member State. To apply the rules on lis pendens,
Article 27 requires that the claim concerns the same cause of action and the same
157
parties. In the Tatry case, the CJEU ruled that both the object and the cause of
158
action must be common in the parallel proceedings. The cause of the WCAM
obviously is the mass tort. However, in view of the specific object of the WCAM
procedure, i.e., to obtain a binding declaration of the settlement, it is questionable
whether a situation of lis pendens would occur if the competing procedure is a
159
collective action for damages. Additionally, it is doubtful whether the
requirement that it concerns the same parties is fulfilled in the specific situation
of opt-out settlements under the Dutch WCAM where the interested parties as
160
such are not litigating parties. The issue of parallel proceedings has not come
up in Dutch practice, and it will not be further discussed.
C. Vesting Jurisdiction in the Shell and Converium Cases
Of the six settlements that have been declared binding as to date, the question
of international jurisdiction was addressed in only two cases, namely the Shell
161
case and the Converium case. Both concerned securities cases where the main
162
issue was misleading information provided to the investors. In another case, the
securities lease case Dexia, there were 4,000 Belgian interested parties involved,
but these were excluded from the settlement in view of particular mandatory
163
rules in force in Belgium. Clear cross-border aspects were also evident in two
164
other cases. In the Vedior case, approximately 55% of the interested parties
were domiciled abroad and in the Vie d’Or case a small minority of the interested
165
parties was domiciled outside the Netherlands (approximately 5%). However,
in these cases, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal did not deliberate on the question
166
whether it had international jurisdiction. This is probably because all the

EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 143, 143-70 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein eds., 2012).
157. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at 9.
158. Case C-406/92, Tatry v. Maciej Rataj, 1994 E.C.R. I-5439.
159. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 68; Stefanelli, supra note 156, at 146 (referring to the Drouat case,
Case C-351/96, Drouot Assurances SA v. Consolidated Metallurgical Industries (CMI industrial sites), 1998
E.C.R. I-3075). In this case the Court ruled that parties can be considered as the same if their interests are
indissociable. This case concerned a subrogated insurer using this claim as a result of compensating the insured
party. It is, however, not likely that this situation can be compared to parties in opt-out collective settlements.
160. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 68-69.
161. See infra Parts III.C.i-ii.
162. See infra Parts III.C.i-ii.
163. See generally Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7.
164. See generally Vie D’Or, supra note 39.
165. Id. at 43.
166. Id.
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participating parties, notably the (allegedly) responsible parties and the
167
representatives, were Dutch.
1. The Shell Settlement
The Shell case concerned shareholders, residing all over the world, who had
168
suffered financial losses caused by a sudden drop in the price of Shell shares.
169
This was allegedly caused by misleading information by Shell on its oil and gas
reserves. The settlement was concluded on 11 April 2007 between the ad hoc
Shell Reserves Compensation Foundation, the Dutch Association for
Shareholders (Vereniging voor Effectenbezitters, “VEB”), two Dutch pension
funds, on behalf of the injured parties, and the allegedly responsible Shell Group
170
(Shell Petroleum NV and Shell Transport and Trading Company Ltd). The
settlement excluded U.S. shareholders, since several class actions were pending
171
in the United States. In the same year, a New Jersey court refused to take
jurisdiction over non-U.S. shareholders and denied these shareholders their claim
since Shell did not engage sufficient conduct in the United States for a U.S. court
172
to have subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Dutch settlement is thus
complementary to the US action. The Amsterdam Court by turn explicitly
173
considered the US class action and judgment. On 29 May 2001, the Amsterdam
174
Court of Appeal declared the settlement binding on non US-parties.
The Amsterdam Court of Appeal considered that in relation to foreign
interested parties, jurisdiction can be vested on the basis of Article 3(a) of the
Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, since five of the six requesting parties were
175
domiciled in the Netherlands. As far as the interested parties who were
domiciled in an E.U. or EFTA Member State, the court considered that the
Brussels I Regulation or Lugano Convention was applicable, since it concerns a
176
civil and commercial matter. It is clear that the Court regards the interested
177
parties as the defendant, but it did not provide further reasoning on this point.
The court continued that in relation to the Dutch interested parties/defendants,
Article 2 Brussels I Regulation and Lugano Convention provides a basis for

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
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See VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 20.
See generally Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7.
By concluding the settlement the company does not admit liability.
VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 20.
Id.
In re Royal Dutch Shell Transport Securities Litigation, 522 F.Supp.2d 712 (D.N.J. 2007).
Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7.
Id.
See supra note 127 for the contents of this Dutch provision.
See generally Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7.
See generally id.
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178

jurisdiction. These concerned at least one Dutch bank (the Dexia bank) and 751
179
other (legal) persons.
In relation to the non-Dutch interested parties/defendants, the Amsterdam
180
Court of Appeal used Article 6(1) Brussels I to vest jurisdiction. The court
rather extensively deliberated on the requirement that the claims are so closely
connected that hearing them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable
judgments is expedient. It considered that if claims for a binding declaration or
similar (declaratory) claims would be brought in different Member States, there
would be a great risk that the cases would be decided differently. The court
further considered that the interests served by Article 6(1) cannot be undermined
by the fact that the binding declaration might change the applicable law, in view
of a choice of law clause for Dutch law included in the settlement. Neither does
the fact that if the English courts would recognize the judgment; interested
parties that did not opt-out can no longer seize the English courts. These
considerations relate to the fact that one of the alleged responsible parties was the
English company Shell Transport and Trading Company Ltd. who had dealt with
groups of English interested parties. It considered that though the Dutch and
English Shell company were formally separate legal entities, they had the same
course and conducted similar actions and maintained single consolidated group
annual accounts.
The court rather extensively deliberated on the requirement that the claims
are so closely connected that hearing them together to avoid the risk of
irreconcilable judgments is expedient. It considered that if claims for a binding
declaration or similar (declaratory) claims would be brought in different Member
181
States, there would be a great risk that the cases would be decided differently.
The court further considered that the interests that Article 6(1) serves could not
be undermined by the fact that the binding declaration might change the
applicable law, in view of a choice of law clause for Dutch law included in the
182
settlement. Neither does the fact that if the English courts would recognize the
judgment, interested parties that did not opt-out can no longer seize the English
183
courts. These considerations relate to the fact that one of the alleged
responsible parties was the English company Shell Transport and Trading
184
Company Ltd., who had dealt with groups of English interested parties. Though
the Dutch and English Shell companies were formally separate legal entities, they

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
Id. at 5.21.
Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7, at 5.23, 5.24.
Id. at 5.23.
Id. at 5.22.
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had the same course and conducted similar actions and maintained single
185
consolidated group annual accounts.
2. The Converium Settlement
The second case is the Converium case, which in view of the adopted wide
jurisdictional reach has been extensively debated and criticized, both in Dutch
186
doctrine and abroad. In this case, the responsible parties were a Swiss
reinsurance company, Converium Holding AG (currently known as SCOR
Holding AG) and the Swiss company Zurich Financial Service Ltd. that sold
187
shares for Converium. It sold shares of stocks listed on the SWX Swiss
188
Exchange (“SWX”) and on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).
Investors suffered losses as a result of alleged misstatements by these companies,
189
causing the share prices to drop. Class actions were brought in the United
190
States, which were consolidated in the Southern District Court of New York. In
2008, that court declined subject-matter jurisdiction in relation to foreign class
191
members buying shares on the SWX. Two later U.S. settlements were also
192
confined to U.S. residents and non-U.S. residents buying on the NYSE. On 8
July 2010, the Converium settlement in the Netherlands was concluded for non193
U.S. shareholders that had bought shares on the SWX. The ad hoc Converium
Foundation, incorporated in the Netherlands and the Dutch Shareholders
194
association (VEB) were the representatives in the case. Of the approximately
195
12,000 interested parties, 8,500 were Swiss residents and 1,500 U.K. residents.
196
Only 3% of the interested parties were resident in the Netherlands. In an
interim decision of 12 November 2010, the Amsterdam Court provisionally
accepted jurisdiction, and it upheld this in its final decision of 17 January 2012,
197
declaring the settlements binding.
The Amsterdam Court provided an extensive reasoning to justify its
198
international jurisdiction. Before going into the details of the applicable
jurisdiction rules, the court explicated that a request to declare the settlement
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
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Id. at 5.26.
Kramer, supra note 6, at 79.
Converium, supra note 8.
Id. at 2.1.
Kaal & Painter, supra note 11, at 177.
Converium, supra note 8, at 5.2.1.
Id. at 2.2.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 10.4.
Kramer, supra note 6, at 63, 78.
Id. at 78.
Converium, supra note 8, at 2.14.
Kramer, supra note 6, at 79.
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binding under the WCAM scheme has two main purposes. The first one is to
199
secure the binding force of the obligation to pay compensation to the victims.
The second aim is to ensure that the interested parties (beneficiaries) could no
200
longer initiate proceedings against the allegedly liable parties. The Court
underlines that the settlement is complementary to actions and settlements in the
United States, from which non-U.S. parties and parties that did not buy shares on
201
the NYSE but on the SWX were excluded. In view of the restriction of the right
of access to justice as a result of binding declaration and the right to be heard—as
guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(“ECHR”), the Dutch Constitution and the Rv (Dutch Civil Code of
Procedure)—the Court states that it is essential that the interested parties can
202
express their views on the question of jurisdiction. In line with the Shell case,
the Amsterdam Court of Appeal bases its jurisdiction on the of the Brussels I
Regulation (in relation to parties domiciled in the European Union), on the
Lugano Convention (in relation to interested parties domiciled in Switzerland), as
well as Dutch internal jurisdiction rules (in relation to interested parties that were
203
domiciled outside the European Union or Lugano States).”
As in the Shell case, it alleged that the interested parties are to be regarded as
‘defendants’ and this provided jurisdiction for the Dutch Court in relation to the
204
approximately 200 Dutch (known) interested parties. This also created
205
jurisdiction for the other interested parties pursuant to Article 6(1) Brussels I.
The Amsterdam Court of Appeal “considered that it concerned a collection of
claims whereby the defendants would—once the settlement was declared
206
binding—no longer be entitled to bring proceedings in any other court.” As in
the Shell case, the court reasoned that bringing the claim in different Member
207
States would result in different and thus irreconcilable judgments. The close
connection and the sound administration of justice justify adopting jurisdiction
over the other approximately 11,800 interested parties as well, according to the
208
Court.
Probably realizing that these bases were rather weak in view of the very
small number of Dutch interested parties, the Court additionally turned to Article
209
5(1) Brussels I concerning contractual claims to found jurisdictions. For this

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Converium, supra note 8, at 2.8.
Id. at 2.10.
Id. at 2.5.
Id. at 2.13; Kramer, supra note 6, at 8.
Kramer, supra note 6, at 79.
Id. at 80.
Converium, supra note 8, at 2.6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.11.
Kramer, supra note 6, at 80.
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purpose, it did not consider the nature of the underlying claim (which was
210
tortious), but focused on the settlement agreement as the basis of the claim. The
Court referred by analogy to a CJEU ruling on Article 5(3) concerning tortious
claims, in which it was decided that this provision could also be used as a
211
jurisdictional basis if it concerns a preventive action. It also mentions another
CJEU case where the court ruled that Article 5(1) could also be invoked when the
212
formation of the contract was contested. It argued that the place of performance
of the obligation to pay compensation was in the Netherlands, since the
213
representative organizations were seated in the Netherlands. The Court
concluded that on each of the bases mentioned independently, the Dutch court
214
had international jurisdiction.
As in the Shell case, in relation to interested parties/defendants that are not
domiciled in the European Union or the EFTA States, the Amsterdam Court used
215
Article 3 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure to establish jurisdiction. It
concluded that in relation to these parties it has jurisdiction on the basis of Article
3(a) since two of the requesting parties (the Converium foundation and the Dutch
216
shareholders association) were domiciled in the Netherlands. Additionally, it
217
used Article 3(c) to establish jurisdiction. This article explains that the Dutch
court has international jurisdiction if the legal proceedings are otherwise
218
sufficiently connected with the Dutch legal sphere. This is the case, according
to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, since the performance of the obligations
arising out of the settlement agreement—payment of damages—was to be carried
219
out in the Netherlands. This approach is in line with the purpose of the WCAM
scheme: to declare the settlement binding so that is obtains preclusive effect upon
220
all interested parties that did not opt out. However, the link with the
221
Netherlands is extremely weak and the reasoning somewhat artificial. It
remains to be seen whether this would stand the jurisdictional review in case the
responsible party seeks recognition to invoke res iudicata against a party
222
initiating litigation in another country.

210. Converium, supra note 8, at 2.8.
211. Case C-167/00, Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Karl Heinz Henkel, 2002 E.C.R. I-8111, I8124, I-8142.
212. Case 38/81, Effer SpA v. Hans-Joachim Kantner, 1982 E.C.R. 825, 832.
213. Converium, supra note 8, at 2.9.
214. Id. at 2.14.
215. See supra note 125 for the text of this Dutch provision.
216. Converium, supra note 8, at 2.12.
217. Id.
218. See supra note 127 for the text of this Dutch provision.
219. Converium, supra note 8, at 2.12.
220. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 17.
221. See id. at 58.
222. See infra Part IV.C.
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D. Problematic Issues and Further Criticism
The reasoning of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has two primary problems.
The first one is the positioning of the interested parties or beneficiaries
223
(“belanghebbenden”) as defendants. It is questionable whether the concept of
defendant or person to be sued can be construed so as to cover the interested
224
parties in the WCAM scheme. The case law of the CJEU does not give
225
guidance on this point. Views in doctrine differ, though Dutch scholars and
226
practitioners generally seem to support the assessment of the Amsterdam Court.
The reasoning is that these parties are notified of the request to declare the
settlement binding, they can raise objections, and have the right to file a petition.
In addition, the parties’ rights are protected by procedural guarantees and the opt227
out right, and they are regarded as potential defendants or respondents. From
the perspective of the purpose of the WCAM, to get the settlement agreement
228
declared binding, this seems reasonable. However, from an outsider’s or
European perspective to regard parties that are au fond beneficiaries of the
settlement agreement and from a litigation perspective, potential claimants as
229
defendants might very well not be acceptable. At the same time, it is clear that
the Brussels I Regulation does not seem to offer a much better alternative to vest
jurisdiction, and Article 2 is the main rule that should accommodate all types of
230
cases. In the WCAM scheme, surely the allegedly responsible party is also not
231
intended to be regarded as a defendant.
The second problematic issue is the application of the international
jurisdiction rules relating to the subject-matter, as included in Article 5 Brussels I
232
Regulation. In the Converium case, the Court used Article 5(1) on contract
jurisdiction as a basis, regarding the settlement agreement as a contract sui
233
generis. The CJEU has ruled that the term “contract” has to be interpreted
223. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 80.
224. This qualification is also remarkable in view of a ruling of the Dutch Supreme Court in a corporate
petition case, where it explicitly disregarded the domicile of the interested parties for the purpose of the
Brussels I jurisdiction rules. See HR 25 juni 2010, NJ 2010, 370 m.nt. (Neth.).
225. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 38.
226. See Maurice V. Polak, Ledereen en Overal? Internationaal Privaatrecht Rond Massaclaims, 81 NJB
2346, 2349 (2006); Ruud Hermans & Jan de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk, International Class Action Settlements in
the Netherlands Since Converium, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDES, CLASS AND GROUP
ACTIONS 2014, no. 11 (2013), available at http://www.mondaq.com/x/270462/international+trade+investment/
International+Class+Action+Settlements+In+The+Netherlands+Since+Converium. Contra VAN LITH, supra
note 104, at 42-45.
227. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 38.
228. Kramer, supra note 6, at 88.
229. Id.
230. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 39.
231. Id. at 38-39.
232. Id. at 42.
233. See Converium, supra note 8; See VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 43.
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234

autonomously, meaning “obligations entered into by free will.” In general, the
235
CJEU uses a restrictive interpretation. For example, pre-contractual liability is
236
not to be regarded as a contractual matter. The settlement agreement only
becomes a binding contract towards the interested parties, once it has been
declared binding, and it may be doubted whether this head of jurisdiction can be
237
used.
The wide jurisdictional reach coupled with the general attractiveness of the
Dutch WCAM scheme has resulted in “class settlement tourism” to the
238
Netherlands. It is highly controversial whether the way in which the
239
Amsterdam Court of Appeal establishes jurisdiction is acceptable.
Additionally, Dutch practice has resulted in forum shopping, as evidenced in the
Converium case, a phenomenon that contradicts the European civil justice
240
system. The wide jurisdictional reach of the Amsterdam court has been
241
criticized in the Netherlands and in other countries. For example, a LatinAmerican commentator stated “Amsterdam is aggressively vying to establish
242
itself as a hub for worldwide class action settlements.” A Belgian commentator
also criticized the way the Dutch court underpinned its jurisdiction, but was more
mild in his opinion to state that “I prefer to believe that the Amsterdam judges
worked on the basis of sincere belief that their solution was the best possible one
243
in the given circumstances.”

234. Case 34/82, Martin Peters Bauunternehmung GmbH v. Zuid Nederlandse Aannemers Vereniging,
1983 E.C.R. 987; Case C-26/91, Jakob Handte & Co. GmbH v Traitements Mécano-chimiques des Surfaces
SA, 1992 E.C.R I-3967; see also VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 43-44.
235. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 44.
236. Case C-334/00, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v Heinrich Wagner Sinto
Maschinenfabrik GmbH (HWS), 2002 E.C.R. I-7357.
237. In a Dutch commentary, it has also been argued that the location of the obligation in question within
the meaning of Art. 5(1) has to be decided in accordance with the lex causae and that the applicable Dutch law
(Art. 6:116, BW) refers to the place of creditors; in other words the domicile of the interested parties and not
that of the Converium Foundation. See VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 52-53. However, according to CJEU
Tessili, Case 12/76, Tessili v. Dunlop, 1976 E.C.R. 1473, 1481, parties can also stipulate the place of
performance. The ad hoc establishment of the party bearing the obligation to pay in the Netherlands and further
stipulations on payment, may be regarded as a choice for the place of performance. See Case 12/76, Tessili v.
Dunlop, 1976 E.C.R. 1473; Converium, supra note 8.
238. Jeroen Kortmann, Case Note: Converium, 46 JOR 448, 462 (2011).
239. Kramer, supra note 6, at 80.
240. Resolution on Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, EUR. PARL. DOC.
P7_TA0021, no. 26 (2012). Specifically in relation to collective redress, the European Parliament in its
Resolution of 2012, no. 26, points out that a rush to the court (forum shopping) should be prevented. Id. See
also the summary of the public consultation on collective redress. Hess et al., supra note 62, at 13.
241. Kramer, supra note 6, at 80. For a critical review in the Netherlands, see VAN LITH, supra note 104,
at 23.
242. Gidi, supra note 14, at 953.
243. Benoit Allemeersch, Transnational Class Settlements: Lessons from “Converium”, in COLLECTIVE
ACTIONS: ENHANCING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND RECONCILING MULTILAYER INTERESTS? (Stefan Wrbka, Steven
Van Uytsel, Mathias Siems (eds), Cambridge University Press 2012) 364, 384.
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The way the Amsterdam Court applied the European jurisdiction rules is not
entirely convincing, but the Brussels I rules are simply not well suited to
244
accommodate the WCAM scheme. The application of both Article 2 and
Article 6(1) is as a result problematic, whereas the contract and tort jurisdiction
under Article 5 also pose difficulties. As was mentioned earlier, the opt-out
nature of the WCAM scheme also casts doubt on the validity of an eventual
245
choice of court rule under Article 23 Brussels I Regulation. Though including
such a choice of court rule in the settlement agreement might be wise, it is not
clear whether choice of court would stand the test if such a case would end in the
CJEU. The Dutch Court should submit preliminary questions to the CJEU to
246
resolve these matters. This inevitably involves the risk that the Dutch WCAM
247
practice will be restricted.
Apart from the European intricacies, it is submitted that the Dutch court has
stretched its jurisdiction to the limits and perhaps even beyond, in comparison
248
with the United States. It is advisable to adopt a more reticent approach to the
249
jurisdictional question in future cases. In this regard, it is noteworthy that in
June 2013, the Dutch Minister of Security and Justice reflected on the matter in
250
response to a question of Members of Parliament. The question related to
concerns on the wide territorial reach of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in the
251
Converium case. The Minister replied that the Court had applied the existing
252
jurisdiction rules, and that it is primarily a European matter. However, the
Minister promised to critically follow the developments and to review the
253
situation in two years. The Minister further stressed that there has only been
one case where there were limited connections with the Netherlands, and that
none of the (interested) parties concerned raised objections against the adoption
254
of jurisdiction by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal.
Meanwhile, it is not to be expected that the European legislature will further
255
regulate the matter of international jurisdiction in the near future. In the recast
of Brussels I, collective redress and the necessity to include special rules was
256
discussed,
but not followed-up. As discussed, the Commission’s
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Kramer, supra note 6, at 80.
See supra Part III.B.
Kramer, supra note 6, at 81.
See id.
See VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 50-54.
Kramer, supra note 6, at 81.
Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 2012-2013, 33126 no. C (Memorie van Antwoord),

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Kramer, supra note 6, at 64.
See Commission Green Paper on Review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction

1-2.
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Communication on collection redress refers to the Brussels I Regulation that
should be “fully exploited,” and the Commission refrains from further regulating
257
the matter. Solutions proposed in the legal literature concentrate on creating a
258
single forum as much as possible. This could be the place where the greater
259
part of the damage occurred, the place where the greater part of the injured
260
parties (in the WCAM the interested parties/beneficiaries) are domiciled, or the
debtor’s home forum, respectively the centre of the debtor’s main interest
261
(“COMI”). The court of the place where most of the injured parties are situated
would be preferable for the purpose of investor’s protection and would be most
262
in line with the Brussels I scheme. However, this does not provide easy
solutions where the groups of injured parties are more-or-less equally spread and
263
are domiciled in many different countries. It is submitted that for the purpose of
legal certainty, simplicity, and to facilitate a settlement and damage scheduling,
264
the COMI is to be preferred. However, this would imply that foreign allegedly
responsible parties, such as Converium, are no longer admitted to the WCAM
265
scheme.
IV. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS
A. Relevance of Recognition and Enforcement and Applicable Rules
The question on the recognition and enforcement of Dutch WCAM
settlements, similarly to U.S. class settlements, is often viewed from a
266
fundamental perspective. It is sometimes argued that the specific features,
particularly the opt-out nature, would be irreconcilable with central values

and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, at 11, COM (2009) 175
final (Apr. 21, 2009) (“it should be reflected whether specific jurisdiction rules are necessary for collective
actions”).
257. See supra Part II.B.ii.
258. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 58-61; Lein, supra note 141, at 141-42; see also Communication from
the Commission, supra note 2, at 13.
259. This could be achieved by adapting Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation; see VAN LITH, supra
note 104, at 42.
260. See Commission Green Paper on Review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, supra note 256, at 13.
261. This concept is also used in Article 3 of the EU Insolvency Regulation. Council Regulation
1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC). Additionally, it has been suggested, to create a special judicial panel for
cross-border collective actions within the CJEU. See Hess et al., supra note 62, at 13; See Communication from
the Commission, supra note 2, at 13.
262. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 13
263. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 43.
264. Id. at 48.
265. Kramer, supra note 6, at 79.
266. Id. at 64-65.
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267

regarding a fair trial or due process. In a practical sense, the question can arise
when an interested party seeks recognition or enforcement of the settlement in
268
another Member State, or outside the European Union, in another country. This
will occur only in the unlikely event that the responsible party does not live up to
269
its obligations under the settlement. More important is the situation in which a
victim initiates an individual action against the responsible party in another
270
Member State, claiming that he is not bound by the settlement. This raises the
question concerning recognition of the settlement and preclusive effect of a court
271
approval of such a settlement.
Within the European Union, the Brussels I Regulation is applicable as
272
between the Member States. In the European Union, the free movement of
273
judgments is of particular importance. It is sometimes regarded as a fifth,
besides the old four freedoms that aim to support the proper functioning of the
274
internal market. The full recognition and enforcement of both judgments and
extrajudicial decisions, based upon the premise of mutual trust, have gained even
more prominence, and judicial cooperation was intensified pursuant to the Treaty
275
of Amsterdam in 1997, to establish a European judicial area. This has also
resulted in the policy to gradually abolish intermediate measures (i.e., exequatur)
276
for the enforcement of judgments in another Member State. Exequatur will also
277
be abolished in the Brussels I Regulation as a result of the recast. The Brussels
278
I-bis Regulation will also amend the rules on the enforcement of settlements.
The current Brussels I Regulation contains particular grounds of refusal that may
279
pose challenges to the recognition and enforcement of Dutch mass settlement.
The Brussels I-bis Regulation will retain the existing grounds of refusal at the
280
stage of enforcement.

267. Hess, et al., supra note 62, at 8.
268. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 85.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 26.
273. X.E. Kramer, Cross-Border Enforcement and the Brussels I-bis Regulation: Towards a New Balance
between Mutual Trust and National Control over Fundamental Rights, 60 NETHERLANDS INT’L L REV. 343, 347
(2013).
274. The other freedoms being the freedom of persons, capital, goods and services. Kramer, supra note
6, at 65.
275. See id. at 65-67.
276. Kramer, supra note 273, at 345.
277. See supra Part III.A.; see also Kramer, supra note 273, at 345.
278. Kramer, supra note 273, at 355.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 356.
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281

B. The Brussels I Scheme on Recognition and Enforcement

The Brussels I Regulation does not only fall short in accommodating
jurisdiction in collective redress, but the rules on the recognition and enforcement
282
are not well suited either. Apart from the remark in the Recommendation that
the Brussels I Regulation applies, the E.U. policy maker did not provide further
283
guidance. It is noteworthy that in the Commission proposal on the recast of
Brussels I, judgments in collective redress were excluded from the abolition of
284
exequatur. The Commission considered that the stakeholders expressed
concerns in relation to the enforcement of collective redress judgments and that
the procedures vary widely per Member State in relation to the scope of those
procedures, which victims these cover, the (public) authorities involved, and
285
whether they proceed from an opt-in or opt-out model. Mutual trust in this
286
matter is apparently lacking. In the final version new Regulation (Brussels Ibis), this exclusion is deleted because the grounds of refusal have been retained
287
as a safety valve to revoke enforcement.
1. Recognition and Enforcement of Court Judgments
Regarding the judicial decision to declare the settlement binding under the
WCAM scheme, the question is whether it is a “judgment” within the meaning of
288
Article 32 of the Brussels I Regulation. Doctrinally, views differ on this matter.
289
A leading ruling of the CJEU is Solo Kleinmotoren. In this case it stated that in
order to be a “judgment” for the purposes of the Convention, the decision must
281. This section is largely based on Kramer, supra note 6, at 82-89 with the approval of the editors and
the publisher.
282. See inter alia Watt, supra note 129, at 111; see inter alia Burkard Hess, Cross-Border Litigation and
the Regulation Brussels I, IPRAX 2010, at 115.
283. See supra Part II.B.ii.
284. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Jurisdiction and
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), at 5, COM (2010)
748 final (Dec. 14, 2010).
285. Id. at 7.
286. Id.
287. Kramer, supra note 273, at 356.
288. Kramer, supra note 6, at 83; Polak, supra note 226, at 2353; Arons & Van Boom, supra note 17, at
880-81; Astrid Stadler, Grenzüberschreitender Kollektiver Rechtsschutz in Europa, 2009 JURISTENZEITUNG
121, 126; VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 108-11; Axel Halfmeier, Recognition of a WCAM Settlement in
Germany, 2012 NEDERLANDS INT’L PRIVAATRECHT 176, 178-80. Negative: Watt, supra note 129, at 114 (in
relation to class action settlements in general). In doubt: Burkhard Hess, A Coherent Approach to European
Collective Redress, in EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 107, 114 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva
Lein eds., 2012); PATRICK WAUTELET, BRUSSELS I REGULATION, comments, at art. 32, no. 39 (Ulrich Magnus
& Peter Mankowski eds., 2011). Bariatti, supra note 14, focuses only on the question of whether the settlement
is to be regarded as a court settlement within the meaning of article 58 Brussels I, and seems not even to
consider it a possibility that the declaration qualifies as a judgment.
289. Case C-414/92, Solo Kleinmotoren v. Boch, 1994 E.C.R. I-2237.
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emanate from a judicial body of a Contracting State, deciding on its own
290
authority, on the issues between the parties. That condition is not fulfilled in the
case of a settlement, even if it was reached in a court of a Contracting State and
291
brought legal proceedings to an end. Settlements in court are essentially
contractual in that their terms depend first and foremost on the parties’
292
intention.
As for the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, it can be disputed that it acts ex
293
officio. It is designated by law to decide on the declaration, but the settlement
294
as such is reached before the declaration is requested. Nevertheless, there is
295
room to regard the settlement approval as a judgment. The granting of the
declaration is not just a simple ‘yes or no’ upon formalities. The Court has to
review a whole range of issues, including whether the requirements regarding
representativeness have been met, and whether the settlement amount is
296
reasonable for each category of victims. Interested parties are served and can be
heard in the proceedings; these are important requirements in view of the
Denilauler and Gambazzi rulings as part of the right to be heard and respecting
297
fundamental procedural rights. Throughout the process of approval, the court
plays an active role in managing the case and in setting procedural requirements,
298
e.g., regarding notification. It is, therefore, likely that the decision to declare
the settlement binding is to be regarded as a judgment, and thus be recognized
and enforceable under the Brussels I Regulation, subject to the applicability of
299
the grounds of refusal. Furthermore, the obligations of the responsible party
300
arising out of the settlement can be enforced.
2. Enforcement of Settlements
Another question, which is particularly important if the court approval is not
to be regarded as judgment, is whether the declaration can be regarded as a
‘settlement’ within the meaning of Article 58 Brussels I. According to this
provision, the settlement is enforceable under the same conditions as authentic
301
instruments. Article 57, regarding authentic instruments, refers to the procedure
290. Id. at para. 17.
291. Id. at para. 18.
292. Id.
293. See generally, e.g., Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7.
294. See id.
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. See Case 125/79, Denilauler v. Couchet, 1979 E.C.R. 1553; Case 394/07, Gambazzi v. Daimler
Chrysler, 2009 E.C.R. I-2563.
298. See, e.g., Gambazzi, supra note 297.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at art. 58.
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of Article 38 et seq. regarding the enforcement of judgments; however, the only
302
ground of refusal is public policy.
There appear to be two problems in relation to applying Article 58 to mass
settlements, and in particular those reached under the Dutch WCAM. The first is
that this provision requires that the settlement has been approved by a court in the
303
course of proceedings. If this requirement is to be understood as having been
reached in the course of adversarial proceedings, the Dutch settlement would not
304
be covered. In the earlier referenced Solo Kleinmotoren ruling, the European
Court of Justice referred to ‘an enforceable settlement reached before a court,’
though this was in the context of distinguishing the settlement in dispute from a
305
judgment. It also emphasized the contractual nature of the settlement in the
sense of Article 58, whereas the court approval aims to create preclusive effect
306
for the entire group of interested parties. The mass settlement itself is reached
307
between the representative(s) and the responsible party. In view of this lack of
clarity, the new Brussels I bis Regulation includes a definition in Article 2,
308
subsection (b). It defines the court settlement as a settlement “which has been
approved by a court of a Member State or concluded before a court of a Member
309
State in the course of proceedings.” This will definitely cover the court
approval of mass settlements, and it is likely that the current Brussels I
Regulation will also be interpreted in this light, since the definition is a
clarification rather than an amendment.
The second problem with the application of Article 58 Brussels I, and one
that the corresponding Article 59 Brussels I bis does not resolve, is that it refers
310
exclusively to the enforcement of settlements. It provides that settlements
enforceable in the Member State of origin shall be enforceable (Brussels I bis:
enforced) in the State addressed (Brussels I bis: in the other Member States)
311
under the same conditions as authentic instruments. Likewise, Article 57
Brussels I and the corresponding Article 58 in Brussels I bis on authentic
312
instruments only mention enforcement and not recognition. The reason is that
the Brussels provision on settlements is concerned with the enforcement of a
313
settlement agreement as a contract. However, as regards mass settlements, the
302. See id. at art. 57.
303. See id. at art. 58.
304. See Watt, supra note 129, at 114; see VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 111-15; see Halfmeier, supra
note 288, at 178-80.
305. See Case C-414/92, Solo Kleinmotoren v. Boch, 1994 E.C.R. I-2237.
306. See id.
307. See, e.g., id.
308. See Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 13, at art. 2(b).
309. Id.
310. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at art. 58.
311. See id.
312. See id. at art. 57; Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 119, at art. 58.
313. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at art. 58.
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primary concern is not the enforceability of the settlement between the
contracting parties; it is to recognize preclusive effect as a result of the binding
nature of the settlement in relation to all the interested parties that did not opt
314
out. For this reason, the provision on settlements is probably of little use to
facilitate the mass settlement.
3. Public Policy and Other Grounds of Refusal
If the mass settlement were to be regarded as a judgment under the Brussels I
Regulation, its effect can nevertheless be mitigated if the grounds of refusal as
315
laid down in Articles 34 and 35 are invoked. Under the current rules, these
grounds can be invoked to appeal the declaration of enforceability in declaratory
proceedings regarding the recognition or where recognition is important as an
316
incidental question. Under the Brussels I bis Regulation, the exequatur will be
abolished, but identical grounds of refusal can be applied on application by a
317
party against whom enforcement is sought. On application by an interested
318
party, these grounds of refusal will also apply to the recognition of judgments.
In relation to mass limitation, the issue of recognition is most likely to arise when
an interested party that did not opt out wishes to initiate individual proceedings in
319
another Member State.
Articles 34 and 35 include the public policy exception, improper service,
irreconcilability of judgments, and violation of specific exclusive jurisdiction
320
rules. For the purpose of Dutch mass settlements in view of the opt-out
character of the procedure, public policy within the meaning of Article 34(1) and
321
proper service as included in Article 34(2) are particularly important. In view
of the criticism on the wide jurisdiction of the Dutch court in the Converium
case, it should be noted that a violation of the jurisdiction rules is, in general, not
a ground to refuse recognition or enforcement, unless particular exclusive or
322
protective (consumer) jurisdiction rules apply.
In relation to public policy, the starting point is that the law of the Member
323
State where recognition and enforcement is sought becomes decisive. However,

314. See generally id.
315. See id. at arts. 34-35.
316. See id. at arts. 33, 45.
317. See Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 13, at art. 46.
318. See id. at art. 45.
319. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at art. 45(1)(a).
320. See id. at arts. 34-35.
321. See generally id.
322. See id. at art. 35(3) (stating that the test of public policy may not be applied to the rules relating to
jurisdiction).
323. See id. at art. 34.
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324

it must concern a manifest breach of public policy. The CJEU has repeatedly
325
ruled that this ground of refusal should be interpreted strictly. It is not available
in the case of a discrepancy between national rules; it should concern a manifest
326
breach of a fundamental principle. A violation of Article 6 European
Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) or Article 47 of the Charter of
327
Fundamental Rights of the European Union will generally qualify as such. This
328
ground of refusal has been accepted only in incidental cases. Can the opt-out
nature of the Dutch mass settlement mechanism be regarded as breaching a
fundamental principle? In the Dutch literature, this question has been answered in
329
the negative, which is backed up by certain non-Dutch scholars. However, most
other scholars have expressed serious doubts regarding the compatibility of the
330
opt-out nature with domestic or European public policy. In this context, it is
interesting to note that the European Court of Human Rights in relation to Article
6 ECHR dealt with the issue of collective procedures in the case Lithgow v.
331
United Kingdom. The Court stated that the right to an individual procedure may
be limited or restricted if such a restriction serves a legitimate goal and is not
332
disproportionate. In a later case, it concluded that Article 6 had not been
violated, since “in proceedings involving a decision for a collective number of
individuals, it is not always required that every individual is heard before a
333
court.” The WCAM can be said to fulfil a legitimate goal, namely, to enable
334
compensation of large groups of victims by means of a settlement. The high
number of victims and the relatively low value of the claim per victim make

324. See id.
325. See C-394/07, Gambazzi v. Daimler Chrysler Can. Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-2563; C-7/98, Krombach v.
Bamberski, 2000 E.C.R. I-1935; C-38/98, Régie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v. Maxicar SpA, 2000 E.C.R.
I-2973; Case 145/86, Hoffmann v. Krieg, 1988 E.C.R. 645.
326. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at art. 34.
327. See id. at art. 47.
328. See generally, C-334/00, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v. Heinrich Wagner Sinto
Maschinenfabrik GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. I-7357.
329. Arons & Van Boom, supra note 17, at 881-82; VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 124-30. See also
Halfmeier, supra note 288, at 176, 178-80, who concludes that this procedure does not constitute a violation of
German public policy.
330. Specifically in relation to the Dutch WCAM: Bariatti, supra note 14, at 335-36; Astrid Stadler,
Kollektiver Rechtsschutz und Revision der Brüssel I-Verordnung, in RECHT OHNE GRENZEN, FESTSCHRIFT
KAISSIS 951, 957 (Reinhold Geimer & Rolf A. Schütze eds., 2012). In general in relation to opt-out collective
redress mechanisms: Mihail Danov, The Brussels I Regulation: Cross-Border Collective Redress Proceedings
and Judgments, 6 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 359, 388-91 (2010); Hess, supra note 282, at 120; Duncan Fairgrieve,
The Impact of the Brussels I Enforcement and Recognition Rules on Collective Actions, in
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 171, 178-86 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein eds., 2012).
331. See Halfmeier, supra note 288, at 176, 182. See generally Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 329 (1986).
332. Lithgow, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 329.
333. Wendenburg v. Germany, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R.
334. See generally id.

268

04_KRAMER_MASTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/19/2015 12:51 PM

Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 27
335

individual litigation an unreasonable option. This case law does not explicitly
336
address the opt-out mechanism.
It is clear that the current European tide is against the opt-out system, as the
337
Commission Recommendation evidences. This led Hess to conclude that opt338
out mechanisms are not in accordance with current European procedural law.
In spite of the substantive and procedural checks and balances in Dutch
legislation, recognition and enforcement of the decision to declare the settlement
binding is therefore not guaranteed in (all) the other Member States.
A specific ground of refusal relates to proper service, enumerated in Article
339
34(2) Brussels I. It concerns the situation in which the judgment was given in
default of appearance, and the document instituting proceedings was not served
in a timely manner and in such a way as to enable the defendant to arrange for his
340
defense. The question is whether this provision applies to the Dutch settlements
341
mechanism. Under Dutch law, the decision to declare the settlement binding is
not a default judgment, but in view of the autonomous interpretation, this will not
342
be an obstacle. A more important issue is that application of this provision
requires that the interested parties can indeed be regarded as defendants within
the meaning of Brussels I Regulation. If it were to be applicable within the E.U.,
the Service Regulation would apply. In relation to interested parties that are
unknown, or where the domicile is unknown, it is important that all efforts be
343
made to actually reach the defendant. In the Dexia case, the Amsterdam Court
of Appeal underlined the importance of a proper notice being given to the
344
interested parties by reference to Article 6 ECHR. In this case, the Court found
345
it sufficient that the group as a whole had been served properly. However, in
later cases the relevant European and international instruments were consistently
applied, and extensive efforts were made to serve the parties and to reach
346
unknown parties or parties with unknown domiciles. Particularly in the Shell

335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

See generally id.
See generally id.
See supra Part II.B.
Hess, supra note 282, at 120.
See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at art. 34(2).
See id.
See Halfmeier, supra note 288, at 176, 183, who concludes that this provision is not applicable.
Stéphanie Francq, Article 34, in EUROPEAN COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:
BRUSSELS I REGULATION 644, 680 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski eds., 2nd rev. ed. 2012).
343. See generally European Parliament and Council Regulation 1393/2007, at art. 19, 2007 O.J. (L 324)
79, 84 (EC), repealing Council Regulation 1348/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 37 (EC); Case C-327/10, Hypotecní
Banka, a.s. v. Lindner, 2011 E.C.R. I-11543; Case C-292/10, G v. de Visser, 2012 E.C.R. I-0000.
344. See generally Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7.
345. Rv arts.1013(5) and 1017(3) (Neth.) generally require service by ordinary mail, unless the court
decides differently. However, in relation to parties domiciled or residence abroad, the E.U. Service Regulation
and the Hague Service Convention will apply and translations to be provided where appropriate.
346. See generally, e.g., Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7; Converium, supra note 8.
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and Converium cases, the Court gave strict instructions in relation to the
347
notification. Advertisements were placed in dozens of newspapers, special
348
websites were established, and banners were placed on websites. Though the
assessment of an individual case will be a task for the court of the Member State
where enforcement is sought, it is submitted that in general the notification
requirements are in compliance with the Brussels I and Service Regulation, and
should therefore not be an obstacle to the recognition and enforcement of Dutch
mass settlements.
C. Recognition and Enforcement in Other Countries
Outside the European Union and the EFTA, domestic rules on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments or settlements of the country
where recognition or enforcement is sought will be decisive. General
requirements pertain to the international jurisdiction of the court that rendered the
judgment as well as due process and public policy. Specific rules on notification,
requiring the personal notification of every class member or, in the situation of
the Dutch WCAM, interested parties, may also be obstacles to the recognition
and enforcement of Dutch settlements. It is noteworthy that the Recommendation
on Transnational Groups of the International Law Association (“ILA”) of 2008
provides that res judicata or enforcement should not be denied because the
349
decision was rendered under an opt-out group action model. The Guidelines for
Recognizing and Enforcing Foreign Judgments for Collective Redress of the
International Bar Association (“IBA”), adopted in the same year, seem generally
350
more reserved towards opt-out procedures. It provides that a court may expect
its decision to have preclusive effect over absent class members that have been
given adequate notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to opt out if
additional conditions arise relating to result of judgment and the
351
representativeness. The ILA Resolution and IBA guidelines do not specifically
deal with collective opt-out settlements.

347. See generally, e.g., Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7; see generally, e.g., Converium, supra note 8.
348. See generally, e.g., Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7; see generally, e.g., Converium, supra note 8.
349. International Civil Litigation and the Interests of the Public: Transnational Group Actions, Report
and Resolution, ILA, at 24 (2008). Resolution 10.1 reads: “The requested court should not refuse to grant res
judicata effect or enforce a foreign decision merely because the decision was rendered under an opt-out group
action model.”
350. See generally Guidelines for Recognising and Enforcing Foreign Judgments for Collective Redress,
IBA (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=C1F679E5-7F71-4A19B3F6-DF5BC79C07A9.
351. Id. at 13-14. Guideline 1.02 reads: “It is reasonable for a court issuing a collective redress judgment
to expect its judgment to be given preclusive effect in respect of absent claimants by the jurisdictions in which
the absent claimants reside if, inter alia: (i) the results obtained for absent claimants are not patently inadequate
in the circumstances; (ii) the interests of absent claimants have been adequately represented; and (iii) absent
claimants have been given adequate notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to opt out.”
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In relation to the somewhat similar U.S. settlements, it has been argued that
352
these will not be recognized and enforced in Latin America. That commentator
also refers to the Netherlands in relation to the Converium case as a “judicial
353
hellhole.” As to the United States, it is likely that it is willing to recognize and
enforce Dutch WCAM settlements. In the Shell case brought in the U.S., the New
Jersey Court, when excluding non-U.S. litigants from its jurisdiction, considered
that the non U.S.-claimants are not without recourse, since a settlement had been
354
brought to the Dutch court on their behalf for a binding declaration. However,
it is very unlikely that the U.S. courts will grant effect to Dutch WCAM
settlements if these were to include U.S.-parties, particularly if it would concern
investors that bought shares on the U.S. market. It may be assumed that it will
require the Dutch court to respect similar jurisdictional limits as the U.S.
355
Supreme Court has imposed in the Morrison case. Vice versa, the Dutch court
356
has been willing to recognize a U.S. class settlement. As discussed earlier, in
both the Shell case and the Converium case, Dutch settlements were concluded
complementary to U.S. class actions and settlement, and in that regard the U.S.
and Dutch systems are in communication with each other.
V. QUESTIONS OF THE APPLICABLE LAW IN THE DUTCH WCAM MECHANISM
A. The Issue of the Applicable Law and Applicable Rules
The law applicable to a collective settlement under the Dutch WCAM has
different aspects. First, it is relevant to determine the law applicable to the
settlement itself as a contract. Second, the law that governs the underlying legal
relationship, either a tort or a contract, may be relevant. Though the WCAM
scheme is not designed to establish liability, the law applicable to the underlying
claims may be of relevance. The most significant issue is the reasonableness of
the settlement as a prerequisite to declare the settlement binding. Third, it is
important to distinguish substantive law issues from the law that governs the
procedural aspects, including the requirement of representativeness. In
accordance with the lex fori processus rule, Dutch law will naturally govern these
elements if the request to declare the settlement binding is brought before the
Dutch court.
In the Netherlands, the applicable substantive law is to be determined on the
basis of European choice of law rules, notably the Rome I Regulation

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
(Neth.).

Gidi, supra note 14, at 955-56.
Id. at 953.
See supra Part III.C.i.
See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Australian Bank Ltd.,130 S. Ct 2869, 2869 (2010).
See generally Ktr.’s-Amsterdam 23 juni 2010, JOR 2010, 225 m.nt. IN Tzankova (SOBI/Deloitte)
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(contractual obligations) and the Rome II Regulation (non-contractual
357
obligations). In the Netherlands, the admissibility of claims does not depend
upon the applicable law. Where appropriate, foreign law will be applied,
including the law applicable to securities liability cases.
B. Relevant Choice of Law Rules for Mass Securities Claims
The applicable law to the settlement agreement will be designated on the
basis of the Rome I Regulation. The main rule pursuant of Article 3 Rome I is
that the parties can select a choice of law clause for, in principle, any substantive
358
law system. This choice will not affect the applicable law to the underlying
359
legal claims, often arising out of tort. If the settlement agreement does not
360
include a choice of law, Article 4(2) Rome I will apply. This designates the law
of the habitual residence of the party that is to conduct the characteristic
361
performance. With regard to the settlement agreement, it is not evident which
party is to be regarded as the characteristic performer. Most Dutch scholars have
argued that in the WCAM settlement, this is the party that has to pay
362
compensation. This will lead to Dutch law where this party, as is the case in
practice, is a habitual resident in the Netherlands. However, if one were to
consider that the characteristic performance could not be determined in relation
to such settlement agreement, the residual rule included in Article 4(4) will be
applicable. This provision refers to the law that is most closely connected to the
settlement. Relevant factors to be considered are the place of the underlying mass
event, or the habitual residence of the majority of the interested parties. In
practice, the settlement usually includes a choice for Dutch law. However, even
in the absence of such a clause, it is likely that the Dutch court would apply
Dutch law either as “place of the party having to perform the payment
obligation” or the “origin” of the mass settlement. This is important to secure full
application of the WCAM, including its substantive provisions laid down in the
Dutch Civil Code.
With regards to the law applicable to the underlying relationship, it is
important to decide what the basis of the liability is. If it is based on a contractual
relationship (breach of contract), the Rome I will be decisive. Thus, the main rule
will be that the chosen law applies pursuant to Article 3 Rome I, unless it
363
concerns a consumer contract within the scope of Article 6(1) Rome I. If no
valid choice of law agreement is made, Article 4 will generally be relevant.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
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See Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; see Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42.
See Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; see Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42.
See Polak, supra note 226.
See Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; see Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42.
See Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; see Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42.
See generally Polak, supra note 226.
See Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; see Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42.
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Article 4(1)(h) is important for securities litigation. It outlines “a multilateral
system which brings together or facilitates the bringing together of multiple
third-party buying and selling interests in financial instruments” within the
365
meaning of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFiD”).
366
According to this provision, the law of that financial market shall be applied.
However, in most securities cases, liability will be based on tort, for example
367
misleading information (prospectus liability) or fraud. In those cases, the Rome
368
II Regulation is applicable. According to Article 4(1) Rome II, the law of the
369
place in which the damage occurs will govern the liability. This is “irrespective
of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and
irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that
370
event occur.” In securities liability cases, there is no physical damage, making
371
determining the place where the damage occurs more difficult. In the
Kronhofer case, the CJEU ruled in relation to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I
Regulation, that the principal place where investors suffered their financial losses
372
is the place where they hold their investment accounts. This ruling is also
373
relevant for the application of Article 4(1) Rome II. In a mass securities case,
there can be many places where the interested investors hold their accounts; this
will ultimately lead to the applicability of a multiplicity of laws. Evidently, this
will cause legal uncertainty for issuers and significantly complicated case
374
handling for judges.
To avoid the application of many possibly different laws, it has been
proposed in legal literature to include a new rule that is more suited for securities
375
litigation or to extensively apply the escape clause under Article 4(3) Rome II.
This provision enables applying the law of another country “[w]here it is clear
from all the circumstances of the case that” this country is “manifestly more
364. Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42.
365. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 118; European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/39, at art.
4.1(14), 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC).
366. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 118.
367. See Astrid Stadler, Conflict of Laws in Multinational Collective Actions – a Judicial Nightmare?, in
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 191, 197-98 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein eds., 2012).
368. Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42. It is sometimes claimed that certain securities cases are
excluded from the scope of the Rome II Regulation since Article 1(2)(d) exempts non-contractual obligations
‘arising out of the law of companies and other bodies corporate or unincorporated’. However, the dominant
view is that this exception does not relate to capital markets liability. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. See Stadler, supra note 367, at 197-98.
372. Case C-168/02, Rudolf Kronhofer v. Marianne Maier and Others, 2004 E.C.R. I-6009 (rejecting to
regard the domicile of the investor as the place where the damage occurs).
373. Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42 (commenting on the connection with the Brussels I
Regulation).
374. See Stadler, supra note 367, at 197-201.
375. Id. at 200-01.
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376

closely connected.” Such a manifestly closer connection might be based in
particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract
377
(“accessory connection”). The more closely connected law could be the law of
378
the market affected by the violation (“market place rule”). For listed securities,
this would be the law of the place of the stock exchange, and for other securities,
the place where the securities were bought, “where a public offer was made or
379
where the prospectus [was] published.” It has also been suggested to bundle
380
liability rules with the applicable disclosure duties. This would lead to the law
of the place where the issuer is incorporated (lex incorporationis) and
381
synchronize liability with the Prospectus Directive. However, since Article 4(3)
Rome II Regulation is only to be applied in exceptional circumstances, bundling
of liability rules with disclosure duties would probably necessitate amending the
382
Rome II Regulation.
It can be concluded that the current system is far from ideal for an efficient
383
handling of mass securities cases. Such multiplicity of laws does not only occur
384
in securities litigation, but also in other mass harm cases. However, as
discussed earlier, the Commission stated in its Communication that it was not
“persuaded that it would be appropriate to introduce a specific rule for collective
385
claims which would require the court to apply a single law.” It added that such
a rule would lead to uncertainty where it was “not the law of the country of the
386
person claiming damages.” This last argument is rather strange, because the
law of the person claiming damages is as such not a connecting factor in the
387
existing choice of law rules. Since there is no legislative solution expected in
the near future, stretching the escape clause under Article 4(3) Rome II seems to
388
be the most feasible option.

376. Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42; Stadler, supra note 367, at 201.
377. Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42; VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 114.
378. See inter alia Stadler, supra note 367, at 201.
379. Id. at 200.
380. Id.
381. European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 65 (EC), amended by
Council Directive 2010/73, 2010 O.J. (L 327) 1 (EC); Stadler, supra note 367, at 200.
382. Id. at 197.
383. Id. at 197-201.
384. Id.
385. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 14; see supra Part II.B.ii.
386. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2 at 14.
387. See supra Part V.B. There are exceptions; notably Article 6(1) refers to the law of the habitual residence
of the consumer in relation to contracts covered by that provision. Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6.
388. See Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 14.
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C. Dutch Practice and Specific Issues in the WCAM
The issue of applicable law is seldom addressed in Dutch practice regarding
389
the WCAM. Apart from the first case, the DES case, the settlement agreement
390
included a “choice of law clause for Dutch law” in all cases. The law applicable
to the underlying legal relationship among the parties in WCAM cases has not
391
explicitly been addressed by the Dutch court in the cases it has dealt with. To
avoid possible complications with the applicable law, in the Dexia case,
concerning securities lease products, the concluding parties decided to exclude
392
Belgian parties before it reached the court. It was clear that particular
mandatory Belgian consumer rules would have prevailed over the less strict
393
Dutch laws applicable to the underlying claims. As is the case in assessing
international jurisdiction, the focus of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal is on the
394
settlement agreements at issue. The Court reviews the requirements to declare
the declaration binding and provides instructions; it does not deal with the
395
question of the liability of the allegedly responsible party.
However, the law applicable to the underlying legal relationship is of
396
importance when assessing the reasonableness of the settlement. Article
7:907(3) of the Dutch Civil Code provides that the request to declare the
declaration binding shall be rejected if “the amount of the compensation awarded
397
is” unreasonable. Elements to be considered pursuant to this provision are the
398
extent of the damage and the possible causes of the damage. To determine if
the settlement is reasonable, it would be necessary to assess the applicable law in

389. See VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 113.
390. Id.
391. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 77-78; see Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7; see Vie D’Or, supra note
39; see Converium, supra note 8; see Hof’s-Amsterdam 17 januari 2012, 2012 NJ, 355 m.nt.
(Converium/Liechtensteinische Landesbank AG).
392. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 20; see Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7.
393. See also VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 20. Apart from Article 6(2) Rome I Regulation, limiting an
eventual choice of law in respect of the underlying (contractual) claim in contracts falling under the (limited)
scope of this provision, overriding mandatory rules within the meaning of Article 9 Rome I Regulation and
Article 16 Rome II Regulation may have to be considered. Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; Regulation
864/2007, supra note 15, at 42.
394. Kramer, supra note 6, at 84.
395. Kaal & Painter, supra note 11, at 167; Kramer, supra note 6, at 84.
396. See Stadler, supra note 367, at 198.
397. BW art. 7:907(3) (Neth.).
398. Id. reads: “The court shall reject the request if: . . . b. the amount of the compensation awarded is not
reasonable having regard, inter alia, to the extent of the damage, the ease and speed with which the
compensation can be obtained and the possible causes of the damage”. According to Article 7:907(2)(a)-9(d)
the settlement agreement should also include a description of the groups of interested persons according to the
seriousness of their loss, an indication of the number of persons in each of these groups, the compensation to be
awarded to each group, as well as the conditions these persons must fulfill to qualify for the compensation. BW
art. 7:907(2)(a)-(d) (Neth.).
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399

relation to each interested party, or at least each group of parties. One might
even say that this analysis requires the court to take into consideration what the
potential outcome of litigation would be and to compare that with the
400
settlement. Though it is accepted in Dutch practice that the applicable law to
the underlying claims of individual interested parties should be taken into
401
account, in practice careful damage scheduling seems to be the solution. The
Dutch legislature rejected a recommendation to include a special rule for foreign
402
parties in assessing reasonableness. The legislature found it unnecessary since
many aspects have to be considered in damage calculation, which may naturally
403
include the applicable law.
It was discussed earlier that procedural matters regulated in the WCAM, such
as the representation requirements, are to be decided upon Dutch law pursuant of
404
the generally accepted lex fori processus rule. However, the demarcation
405
between procedural and substantive law is not always evident. In doctrine the
limitation periods included in the Dutch Civil Code have been regarded as a
406
procedural matter. Article 907(5) of the Dutch Civil Code provides that the
407
request to declare the settlement binding will interrupt the limitation period.
Should a party exercise his opt out right or the request be rejected, a new
408
prescription period should be limited to two years. This proposal was made in
order to release the allegedly responsible party from eventual new litigations
409
after the collective settlement for a longer period. However, in the Rome I and
Rome II Regulations limitation periods are explicitly mentioned as being covered
by the applicable substantive law (lex causae), and are thus not to be regarded as
410
a procedural matter. This means that if an individual party that opted out
wishes to pursue individual litigation in the Netherlands (or in another E.U.
Member State) the law applicable to that claim will determine the prescription

399. See Stadler, supra note 367, at 198.
400. Id.
401. See VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 13.
402. See Parliamentary Proceedings, II 2003/04, 29 414, no. 3, 14-15; Arons & Van Boom, supra note
17, at 864.
403. See Parliamentary Proceedings, II 2003/04, 29 414, no. 3, 14-15; Arons & Van Boom, supra note
17, at 115.
404. See supra Part V.A.
405. See generally BW art. 7:907(5) (Neth.); Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; Regulation
864/2007, supra note 15, at 42.
406. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 119.
407. BW art. 7:907(5) (Neth.).
408. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 120.
409. Id.
410. See Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; see Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42.
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period. If that happens to be a foreign law with a longer prescription period,
412
that law should prevail over the WCAM rules.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Collective redress is on the rise in Europe and at present the Netherlands is
taking the lead in transnational securities mass settlements. It is expected that the
number of mass securities cases that will be brought in European courts will
further increase, particularly in the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court decision
in the Morrison case. The European debate and further legislative activities at the
E.U. level are hampered by diverging domestic systems, fear of abusive
litigation, and diverse views on the acceptable model of collective redress. The
European Commission’s Recommendation of June 2013 is marred by
compromises and a genuine European procedure of collective action and/or
413
settlement is not expected in the near future.
The Dutch WCAM system is by and large in compliance with the common
414
principles established by the Recommendation. However, there are two points
415
of possible conflict. First, the Netherlands only has a collective settlement
416
mechanism and not an accompanying collective action for compensation.
Second, the WCAM is based on an opt-out scheme whereas the Recommendation
417
strongly proceeds from an opt-in scheme to safeguard litigants’ rights. Though
the Recommendation is in the form of non-binding legislation, it marks the
418
current status, and future of, collective redress in Europe. Additionally, it may
influence the acceptance of current cross-border case handling by the Amsterdam
419
Court of Appeal under the WCAM, which has already been criticized. It is
disappointing that the Recommendation only cursorily deals with cross-border
420
aspects of collective redress, considering that these pose real challenges. As
regards to international jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement, the
421
Commission refers to the use of the Brussels I Regulation. In relation to the
choice of law rules, it takes the view that special rules for collective redress are
422
not needed.
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The establishment of international jurisdiction of the Amsterdam Court of
Appeal to declare a collective settlement binding in accordance with the WCAM
423
Act is problematic. The Brussels I Regulation has been developed with a view
to classical party-party litigation and does not sufficiently accommodate
424
collective actions or settlements. Therefore, a mismatch is evident between the
specific WCAM design and the defendant-oriented jurisdiction rules of this
425
Regulation. In the landmark securities cases Shell and Converium, the
Amsterdam Court has designated the interested parties under the WCAM scheme
426
as “defendants.” It is controversial whether this is a correct understanding of
the Brussels I rules since the interested parties are beneficiaries that do not as
427
such take part in the procedure. In a typical class the allegedly responsible
party would qualify as defendant, but under the WCAM scheme this is not the
case, since the responsible party files the petition jointly with the representatives
428
of the class. This makes the application of Article 2 (court of the defendant)
429
and Article 6(1) (multiple defendants) Brussels I problematic. In the Converium
case international jurisdiction was additionally founded on Article 5(1) regarding
430
contractual jurisdiction. Disregarding the underlying legal relationship, the
Court took the settlement agreement and the place of performance of the payment
431
obligation resulting from the binding declaration as point of departure. In the
Converium case, the connections with the Netherlands were overall very weak
432
and this judgment has rightfully been criticized. It is submitted that the
Amsterdam Court overstepped the boundaries of European and internationally
433
accepted jurisdictional rules.
The recognition and enforcement of the decision to declare the WCAM
434
settlement binding also poses challenges. Particularly, the fact that it proceeds
from a settlement agreement, the opt-out scheme and the stretching of the
jurisdictional limits in Dutch practice raise questions as to the recognition and
435
enforcement under the Brussels I Regulation. The settlement agreement is not
clear whether the binding declaration qualifies as a “judgment” and the Brussels I
rules on settlement agreements focus on enforcement rather than on recognition
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to secure preclusive effect. Additionally, it is conceivable that grounds of
refusal and notably the public policy exception may be invoked in case an
437
individual party that did not opt out wishes to initiate individual litigation.
Outside Europe, the opt-out nature, specific procedural features and the wide
territorial jurisdiction may also create obstacles for recognition and
438
enforcement. Similar objections have been raised in relation to U.S. class
439
actions and settlements. As between the Netherlands and the United States, as
of yet, courts have been willing to recognize or implicitly acknowledge each
440
other’s settlements.
The issue of the applicable law has not raised much discussion in Dutch
441
doctrine and is seldom explicitly addressed in practice. As with jurisdiction, the
442
focus is on the particularities of the settlement agreement as a contract. In all
but one of the settlements that have been declared binding to date, a choice of
443
law clause in favor of Dutch law was included. The applicable law to the
underlying claims may nevertheless be relevant to assess the reasonableness of
the settlement amount as one of the prerequisites to declare the settlement
444
binding. It is submitted that the applicable choice of law rules of the Rome I
and II Regulations, and particularly the liability rules for securities cases, are not
well adapted since these will result in a multiplication of applicable laws.
The Commission’s Recommendation marks a step forward in the
445
development of collective redress in the European Union. Dutch mass
settlements and upcoming mechanisms in other Member States, including
England and Wales, and Germany, have put Europe on the map as a venue for
446
collective securities litigation with global aspirations. However, shortcomings
and uncertainties in the existing rules on cross-border litigation pose serious
447
questions. If Europe wants to take the development of collective redress a step
further, the proper regulation of the cross-border aspects should be regarded as a
priority.
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